Returning from China, North Korean workers are paid in dubious IOUs

North Korean workers returning from China with hopes of a big payday are incensed because the government is not paying them in cash. Instead, it’s giving them bank-issued money vouchers, which the workers are worried might end up being worthless, residents told Radio Free Asia.

The vouchers, essentially IOUs, were issued in 2021 in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Authorities explained that they could be used just like cash, and that they would be phased out once the pandemic ended. 

Until then, the vouchers – printed on lower quality paper than the currency –  are supposed to be traded with cash on a 1:1 ratio, but nobody knows how long they will be good.

North Koreans are already distrustful of their government on money matters because in 2009 it revalued the won, issued new currency and limited the amount of older currency that could be traded for the newer one, wiping out the life savings of many. 

Since then, faith in the won has been shaky, so dollars, euros and yuan are therefore freely traded in North Korean marketplaces. Faith in the vouchers is even shakier than the won.

Most of the workers feel like they have returned empty-handed, so they are angry,” a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“Although the party emphasizes that the money vouchers should be used without restrictions like cash, people distrust them because the authorities clearly stated that they are a temporary measure due to the prolonged COVID-19 crisis,” she said.

Assumptions

When workers are sent overseas – mostly to China – there’s already an understanding that the lion’s share of their wages will be forwarded to the cash-strapped government in Pyongyang. 

The remainder, however, is several times more than what they would earn doing the same job in North Korea. 

So the Chinese companies get cheap labor, the government gets a lot of foreign cash, and the workers still come out ahead – or such was the assumption.

The workers, mostly young women working in factories, had been in China since before the pandemic, some for six years or more.

Because they were earning yuan in China the workers thought they would be paid in yuan upon their return.

But they are now told to accept payment in money vouchers, which the people have very little confidence in, the North Pyongan resident said.

Red tape and unfair exchange rates

On top of this, the government appears to be exploiting the workers further through red tape and unfair exchange rates, the sources said. 

“The market exchange rate is 1,700 to 1,800 won per Chinese yuan,” she said. “But the announced rate is fixed at 1,260 won per yuan, so the workers are getting screwed.”

The Chinese companies paid 2,500 yuan (about US$350) for each worker every month, but about two-thirds of this money was sent to the state. 

The workers were said to be earning about 800 yuan ($110) per month, but then red tape fees cut into even that amount.

“There’s management fees at headquarters, maintenance costs at the consular department, insurance costs, social subsidies, and accommodation fees,” the resident said. “When all is said and done the workers are said to be getting between 100 and 300 yuan (US$13-41) for the whole month.”

Remarkably, that is still above the paltry salaries for government-assigned jobs in North Korea.

Another North Pyongan resident said that the workers are getting a raw deal after putting in 14-hour days in China and now have to accept payment in money vouchers.

“The selection of workers dispatched overseas is still ongoing these days, but not many workers are willing to go to China,” she said. “The poor working environment and intensive labor exploitation in China, as well as the fact that the payment is not properly compensated, have become widely known facts.”

She said that some of the workers who returned this time gave up all of their wages and returned with nothing, after the authorities compelled them to donate to various funds and subsidies.

These include supporting national and local construction projects, condolence donations for the late former leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on their death anniversaries, and funds to strengthen national defense.

“They won’t see even a single yuan coin for all their hard work in China,” the first resident said.

 Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

Facebook videos show Lao fishermen using grenades to boost catch

Fishermen in northern Laos are using grenades to haul in large catches that otherwise might take hours of work to net, according to residents and officials, who say the practice threatens to impact fish populations in the region.

It is also illegal.

Two videos posted to Facebook in recent days show fishermen whose identities are obscured, hurling grenades from outboard motor boats into the Mekong River and the Namtha 1 Dam reservoir in Bokeo province.

In the videos, underwater concussive blasts churn sediment to the surface before they cut to fishermen displaying several sizable fish gathered on their vessels. In one video, a grinning fisherman flashes a thumbs up to the camera, celebrating his catch.

A resident of Houayxay district’s Pak Ngao village who, like other sources in this report requested for anonymity for safety reasons, told RFA Lao that a fellow villager was involved in the grenade fishing, despite warnings from the village chief and laws that prohibit the practice in Laos.

“A resident of this village, who threw grenades into the water, posted those videos on Facebook and then deleted them,” he said. 

Other fishermen electrocute the fish, he said.

A method used by some is to tie an electrical cable to a long stick and attach it to a motorcycle battery before dipping it into the water, according to sources.

The resident said the use of explosives and electric shocks should be eradicated because “we should conserve fish for our children.”

He said that “professional” fishermen in the area using traditional methods might stay out on the water “all day and all night,” but only catch a few fish.

Prohibition flouted

The Lao criminal code prohibits the use of explosives, poison, chemicals and electrocution to catch fish. Violators face up to one year in jail and fines of up to 10 million kip (US$500).

Despite the prohibition, a resident of another village in Houayxay told RFA that most of the fish at the local market are “not caught by net, but by explosives or electrocution,” noting that the fish don’t exhibit any of the signs typically associated with net catches, such as damage to their scales and heads from struggling against cordage.

Another villager from Pak Ngao said an area fishmonger confirmed that most of the fish at the market had been obtained illegally, through these means.

“She said that most fish at the market come from the area where explosives and electrocution are used to catch fish,” he said.

The fishermen that use grenades do so “in secret,” said a third resident of Pak Ngao.

“The village authorities can’t do anything to stop them and the higher-level authorities are too far away from the area,” he said, adding that the fishermen are too “dangerous” to be confronted about the practice.

But a provincial official said the cases in the videos are now under investigation.

“If we find the suspects, they’ll be prosecuted according to the law,” he said. “The Mekong River has many fish conservation zones and those fishermen are breaking the rules by illegally fishing in those areas.”

Translated by Max Avary. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

Vietnamese police arrest 4 more Khmer Krom monks in pagoda dispute

Vietnamese police have arrested four more Buddhist monks from the Khmer Krom indigenous group in an ongoing clash over a pagoda in the country’s south.

Authorities in Vinh Long province also arrested an activist during a raid on Thursday at Dai Tho Pagoda, known as the Tro Nom Sek pagoda in Khmer, police said in a statement posted on Facebook. 

The nearly 1.3-million strong Khmer Krom indigenous community live in a part of Vietnam that was once southeastern Cambodia. They face discrimination in Vietnam and suspicion in Cambodia, where they are often perceived not as Cambodians but as Vietnamese. 

Thursday’s raid comes two days after Vietnamese police arrested the head of the pagoda, Thach Chanh Da Ra, and two other followers. 

The dispute with local authorities stems from an incident last November when Thach Chanh Da Ra and others wouldn’t allow a task force from the Tam Binh District People’s Committee to enter the pagoda. 

Thach Chanh Da Ra is accused of filming their visit to “defame local authorities and divide national unity.” He was dismissed from the government-recognized Vietnam Buddhist Sangha in December.

ENG_VTN_MonksDefrocked_03282024.2.jpg
Vietnamese police arrested activist Thach Nha. (Soc Trang province police via Facebook)

On Tuesday, Thach Chanh Da Ra and follower Kim Khiem were accused of posting slandering and insulting videos on social media and charged with “abusing the rights to democratic freedom,” in violation of Article 331, a law that rights groups have said is vaguely written and often used to stifle dissent.

Police also arrested Thach Ve Sanal, another member of the pagoda, on charges of “illegally arresting, holding, or detaining people,” for his alleged role in the November incident.

Cell phones seized

The five men arrested on Thursday were also being detained on suspicion of “abusing the rights to democratic freedom” under Article 331, police said.

A monk who witnessed the arrests told Radio Free Asia that about 10 police officers entered the pagoda, defrocked the four monks and arrested them and the one activist. 

By Buddhist law, monks can only be defrocked by senior monks if they breach Buddhist law – not by police.

When other monks tried to prevent the arrests, the officers responded with violence and confiscated everyone’s cell phones, the witness said.

“The persecution is brutal,” he said. “It is against our tradition and it is inhuman.”  

The Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation condemned Thursday’s arrests, saying in a statement that “the actions of the Vietnamese authorities against these revered spiritual leaders and their supporters are a flagrant violation of fundamental human rights, including the rights to freedom of religion, expression and association.”

Translated by Anna Vu and Yun Samean. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

RFA Khmer contributed to this report.

Fired Myanmar garment workers await court resolution after 4 years

When Phyu Phyu Mar from Myanmar got a job at VK Garments in 2017, she had plans to one day open her own small business. 

Located in Mae Sot, a town straddling the Thai-Myanmar border, VK Garments appeared to be a promising employer, especially since it was a supplier for the British retail giant Tesco. Yet, Phyu’s dreams quickly dissolved into disillusionment.

Despite the initial optimism, Phyu Phyu Mar and 135 of her colleagues found themselves embroiled in a struggle against debt, job insecurity and the loss of their legal status in Thailand after being laid off in 2020.

Their termination by the management of VK Garments came as a direct result of their complaints about labor violations and demands for rightful wages. Although they sought justice through the legal system and were partially compensated in October 2020, the awarded sum fell significantly short of their claims.

ENG_BUR_VKGarmentWorkers_02262024.2.JPG
Former VK Garment workers San San Aye, left, and Khin Mar Aye have waited nearly four years for wages they say they’re owed. They are pictured in Mae Sot, Thailand, Jan. 26, 2024. (Kiana Duncan for RFA)

Now, years later, the repercussions of their stand for fair treatment continue to profoundly affect their lives, and the hope for resolution hinges on two court cases, one local and one international, which they hope will conclude their protracted ordeal.

Thailand case

In January, employees lodged an appeal against VK Garments with Thailand’s Supreme Court, seeking 34 million baht (US$946,000) for unpaid overtime and severance. 

According to the case’s lawyer, Charit Meesidhi, the labor inspector reviewing evidence for the prior court case failed to collect appropriate evidence like pay documentation and interviews that would have allowed Phyu Phyu Mar and her co-workers to prove their case.

But Charit remains cautious about the prospects of the new case as well. 

“According to the legal requirements, the chance to convince the Supreme Court to review the case is extremely difficult,” the lawyer said. “This is subject exclusively to the authority of the Supreme Court and in most cases, it does not accept to review the case.” 

Workers have also not seen a cent of the earnings they say they’re owed because the amount is disputed by all parties in the Thai court cases, causing many to take on increasing debt, work low-paid jobs and become illegal migrants in their adopted homeland. 

ENG_BUR_VKGarmentWorkers_02262024.3.JPG
A small pond near the eastern side of the VK Garments compound in Mae Sot, Thailand, March 21, 2024. Workers say they used water from lakes inside the compound for daily necessities. (Kiana Duncan for RFA)

Khin Mar Aye, another former VK Garments employee, said she was reduced to taking agricultural jobs that pay as low as 36 baht (US$1) a day. 

“At that time, we didn’t have any income for our survival. We had to go to the plantation and we had to work at the onion field,” she said. “For one kilogram of onion, we receive eight baht (22 U.S. cents). We don’t always have this work, maybe 15 or 20 days in a month. We’ve been doing this kind of work until now.” 

U.K. case

In the United Kingdom’s high court, the workers filed a lawsuit on Dec. 18, 2022 against Tesco, its former Thai subsidiary Ek-Chai Distribution Systems, auditor Intertek Group PLC and Intertek Testing Services Limited, all linked to alleged labor violations stemming from VK Garments, for negligence.

Despite manufacturing jeans for the U.K.-based Tesco Group intended for distribution in Thailand, workers earned a mere 2,000 baht (US$55) per month, according to former employees.

They often struggled to receive even this modest amount as management deducted charges for accommodation in worker dormitories, legal work documents they often did not receive and other unexplained fees, significantly reducing their actual take-home pay.

ENG_BUR_VKGarmentWorkers_02262024.4.JPG
Former VK Garments employees say they often felt like they were going to a prison, not a factory. The front gate of the compound is seen March 21, 2024. (Kiana Duncan for RFA)

Workers have also made other allegations of enduring near 100-hour work weeks, unsafe housing that led to the rape of an employee’s child and being forced to purchase other equipment, like lightbulbs, to sew at their stations after dark.

Phyu Phyu Mar said workers had to use a lake in front of the factory for water and that accommodation and bathrooms were unsafe and filthy. 

“I think almost all the workers who are working inside the factory feel like they’re going to prison every day, not a workplace,” she said. 

“Mae Sot doesn’t have industrial zones, it has refugee camps. We are all refugees in this situation.”

A spokesperson for Tesco told Radio Free Asia that they “continue to urge the supplier to reimburse employees for any wages they’re owed.”

“The allegations highlighted in this report are incredibly serious, and had we identified issues like this at the time they took place, we would have ended our relationship with this supplier immediately,” the spokesperson said in a written statement. 

VK Garments declined to comment. 

Waiting game

Khin Mar Aye and Phyu Phyu Mar have seen their debt burgeon during their prolonged wait. 

Initially incurred at VK Garments, their financial obligations have escalated to 50,000 (US$1,413) and 100,000 baht (US$2,823) respectively, due to borrowing from the factory and other lenders at steep interest rates of up to 20%. This was a desperate measure to cover the basic necessities of food and shelter for their families.

ENG_BUR_VKGarmentWorkers_02262024.5.JPG
The eastern side of the gated VK Garments compound in Mae Sot, Thailand, March 21, 2024. (Kiana Duncan for RFA)

Whether or not they will see a resolution soon remains to be seen. Given the complexity of the case, the case’s stakeholders were made aware that the process could take years, said Priscilla Dudhia, public outreach coordinator for Clean Clothes Campaign. 

The group has been involved in the workers’ case since it was flagged in 2020, and it, involving other non-profits, connected workers to Leigh Day, their legal representation in the U.K. 

“Our hope has always been that Tesco and Intertek come to the table and agree to fully compensate the workers for the harms that they’ve suffered,” she said. “One of the big reasons for this is because this claim was issued in 2021 – we’re in 2024, and we’re still not in a position where all the defendants have been served.”

Despite facing harassment by factory staff about the ongoing case, Phyu Phyu Mar says she hopes this will be an example for employers in Thailand.

“I want justice and fairness from that case,” she said. “We had to work very strenuously in the factory, but we faced a lot of violations of our rights and entitlement. This case should be kind of a lesson for the employer, the employer needs to face these kinds of things.”

Edited by Taejun Kang and Matt Reed.

Indonesian President-elect Prabowo to visit China in first official post-polls foreign trip

Nickel downstreaming refers to domestic processing of nickel ore, that is, to refine commodities at home to make exports more valuable. Chinese-linked companies dominate the nickel smelter industry in Indonesia.

Another reason for China’s invitation to Prabowo was that Beijing wanted to ensure that under Prabowo, Indonesia does not move closer to the United States and the West.

“I suspect that China wants to ensure that Prabowo continues the foreign policy that Jokowi previously carried out,” he said.

China is invested in the Prabowo presidency because it wants its projects in Indonesia to stay on track, Raden said.

However, he doesn’t approve of China being Prabowo’s first stop as president-elect.

“Prabowo’s visit to China is too soon. It would have been better if he had waited until he was inaugurated first, then visited a foreign country,” Raden said.

“Visits to foreign countries by the newly inaugurated Indonesian president should first be to neighboring ASEAN member countries such as Malaysia, considering that Indonesia’s interests are much greater in ASEAN than in other countries,” Raden said, referring to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

ID-Prab-pic-THREE.JPG
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) talks with Indonesian President Joko “Joko” Widodo after the 29th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting during Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 2022 in Bangkok, Nov. 18, 2022. [Rungroj Yongrit/Pool/via Reuters]

Prabowo has bucked tradition in another way as well with his overseas trip, according to Zulfikar Rahmat, director of the China-Indonesia Center of Economic and Law Studies (Celios).

This is the first time that a president-elect – one who has not been sworn in – has accepted a foreign governments invitation to visit, Zulfikar told BenarNews. Prabowo is to be inaugurated as president in October.

“There are two reasons for this. The first is, of course, that Prabowo sees China as a partner in the economic sector. We know that in recent years, China has been Indonesia’s number one trading partner,” he said.

“Second, I see that Prabowo wants to continue Jokowi’s legacy, which is [being] close to China.”

Like Jokowi, Prabowo puts Indonesia’s economy front and center, which brings it closer to China, Zulfikar said.

Muradi, a politics and security analyst at University of Padjadjaran in Bandung, said Prabowo had an interest in seeing how China carries out its defense modernization, which is expected to be completed in 2027.

RFA closes Hong Kong bureau after passage of new security law

Radio Free Asia on Friday announced it has closed its Hong Kong bureau, saying the city’s recently enacted national security law, also known as “Article 23,” has raised safety concerns for its reporters and staff members.

RFA will no longer have full-time personnel in Hong Kong but will retain its official media registration there, the organization’s president and chief executive, Bay Fang, said in a statement.

“We recognize RFA’s frontline status – as it is among the last independent news organizations reporting on events happening in Hong Kong in Cantonese and Mandarin,” she said.

“For our audiences in Hong Kong and mainland China, who rely on RFA’s timely, uncensored journalism: Rest assured, our programming and content will continue without disruption,” Fang said.

Hong Kong was once a bastion of free media and expression in Asia, qualities that helped make it an international financial center and a regional hub for journalism.

But demonstrations in 2019 led to the passage of a national security law in 2020 that stifled dissent. Soon after, The New York Times announced it would relocate its digital news operations to Seoul. 

In 2021, the pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily was forced to shut down amid an investigation conducted under the 2020 law.

Sweeping new powers

Last week’s enactment of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, also referred to as Article 23 based on a clause in Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, has intensified uncertainties among Hong Kong journalists.

It has created new offenses, increased punishment for offenders and granted the government sweeping new powers to crack down on all forms of dissent. 

It includes a reference to “external threats” and uses China’s expansive definition of “national security,” which journalists and critics say is vague. 

In February, Hong Kong security chief Chris Tang accused RFA of reporting what he described as “false” criticism that the new law would target media organizations. He called the media outlet a “foreign force” that was misleading the people of Hong Kong. 

“Actions by Hong Kong authorities, including referring to RFA as a ‘foreign force,’ raise serious questions about our ability to operate in safety with the enactment of Article 23,” Fang said in Friday’s statement.

Opened in 1996

RFA opened its Hong Kong office – its first overseas bureau – in 1996. The organization is funded by the U.S. Congress but operates as an editorially independent private news organization. Its mission is to provide news in languages and regions where authorities censor news and stymie the freedom of expression and the press.

The ranking Democratic member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Gregory Meeks, representing New York, said he was “deeply concerned” by the decision, calling RFA “a longstanding beacon of independent journalism” in Hong Kong.

“Since the passage of Hong Kong’s National Security Law in 2020, RFA has been a rare source of independent news coming out of Hong Kong despite facing unrelenting pressure and harassment,” he said in a statement. 

“The closure of RFA’s bureau in Hong Kong, after 28 years, is a stark reminder of how brazenly Beijing has extinguished Hong Kong’s autonomy.” 

RFA’s restructuring of its on-the-ground operations means that staff members will be relocated to the United States, Taiwan and elsewhere amid the closure of the physical bureau, the organization said.

“RFA will shift to using a different journalistic model reserved for closed media environments,” Fang said. “I commend RFA’s journalists and staff for making this difficult transition possible.”

Edited by Malcolm Foster.