Day: March 10, 2024

Police officers paused a movie and turned on the theater lights to check the ages of cinema-goers at a Ho Chi Minh City screening of the popular Vietnamese film “Mai,” which is rated “18+” because it features several sex scenes.

No underage viewers were found, but the Feb. 26 disruption prompted heated debate on social media and showed that Vietnam’s new Cinema Law – which imposes administrative fines for underage viewers – may present some enforcement challenges as the country’s movie industry grows.

The law’s sections on establishing a ratings system, categorizing films and offering warnings for viewers about explicit material were clear in offering implementation guidance, a lawyer from Hanoi who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told RFA. 

“But the regulations on the monitoring of and administrative fines on viewers with inappropriate age at movie theaters are unrealistic and still not clear in terms of authority,” he said.

‘Vibrant market’

Vietnam has several hundred theaters nationwide that show movies from Hollywood and other internationally-produced films that are dubbed into Vietnamese. 

Theaters also show movies made in Vietnam – some of which are funded by the state and are usually focused on historical topics for propaganda purposes. The government has said it hopes to promote homegrown cultural offerings, such as films made in Vietnam.

Vietnam has “a vibrant market that has seen stellar post-pandemic recovery” that pairs well with “a young but dynamic” local filmmaking industry “that is experimenting with new genres and making a wider range of film,” Deadline Hollywood said in an article about the country’s movie industry last month.

“Mai” was released last month at the beginning of the weeklong day of Tet holiday, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year. It quickly proved to be a box office success.

The movie “revolves around the life of a 30-something massage therapist” who meets a younger man who develops a crush on her, according to VN Express. It was rated as “18+” – meaning that only moviegoers 18 and older could buy a ticket.

Mistaken protocol?

Police entered an auditorium of Cinestar Quoc Thanh Cinema in Ho Chi Minh City at around 7 p.m. on Feb. 26, state media reported. 

The inspection was in line with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism’s recent dispatch that requested culture authorities in cities and provinces strengthen the inspection and monitoring of the new cinema regulations.

The ministry’s dispatch also cited recent local media reports that some movie theaters weren’t checking IDs during ticket sales, making it possible for viewers under 18 to buy tickets and watch “Mai.”

“Responsible forces conducted a sudden inspection but did not find any underage viewers at the screening,” a Cinestar Quoc Thanh Cinema’s representative was quoted as saying by the Dan Tri (People’s Knowledge) online news outlet.

But the pausing of the movie at Cinestar Quoc Thanh cinema wasn’t based on what’s written in the law, the lawyer from Hanoi told RFA. “Instead of inspecting the operating process of the cinema, they checked viewers’ identifications,” he said. 

Article 19 of the Cinema Law, which went into effect in January 2023, states that cinemas shall ensure viewers are of the right age according to film ratings.

Article 47 of the law states that provincial People’s Committees have the responsibility to “inspect, settle complaints and denunciations, and handle law violations in cinematographic activities according to their jurisdiction.”

Another government order – Decree 38, issued in 2021 – covers how to handle administrative violations in the fields of culture and advertising.

Permitting audience members to watch movies that are not age-appropriate can result in a fine ranging from 30-40 million dong (US$1,200-1,600). Any profits obtained from such actions can also be confiscated, according to the decree.

‘An uncultured act’

Dinh Thuan Ngo, who worked as a lawyer in Ho Chi Minh City before migrating to the United States, told RFA that the cinemas themselves should be the ones to enforce age requirements for certain films, such as by checking identifications when tickets are purchased.

“In this 21st century, there are many civilized ways in accordance with international standards that the authorities can take rather than that barbaric act,” he said, referring to the Feb. 26 inspection. 

“Entering in such a way was an uncultured act,” he said. “They claim to be people of culture but did not behave as people understanding culture and in a cultural environment.”

Ho Chi Minh City resident Nguyen Dan agreed, saying on Facebook that the authorities behaved in a rude manner. 

“The fact that the police rushed into the film auditorium to inspect whether there were any viewers under 18 must be seen as a big deal,” he said. “The police cannot act so rudely in a country that [claims to be] free and democratic.”

His comment was one of many on Vietnamese language social media sites that were critical of the inspection. 

But on the Facebook page “Thường Dân” (Ordinary People), which generally favors the Vietnamese government, one user said in a post that it was not a coincidence that “all countries around the world have regulations on the age at which people can access feature films on television or in cinemas.”

“When a film is labeled 18+ because it contains many violent images, foul language and steamy  scenes, it should only be accessed by viewers at the age of 18 or over,” the author wrote. 

“Was it a prevention of people’s cultural entertainment activity when an interagency working group, including the police, inspected cinemas when it was reported that children (people under 18) had been allowed to watch the movie?”

RFA sent an email to seek the Cinema Department’s comments on the inspection at Cinestar Quoc Thanh cinema but did not receive an immediate response.

Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

While the Three Brotherhood Alliance move to consolidate territorial gains in northern Shan state, and the Arakan Army continues their attacks across Rakhine state, a new offensive against Myanmar’s junta has begun in Kachin state this month.

On March 7, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)  launched an offensive and quickly captured three military junta bases and 11 small outposts along the 120 km-long (72-mile) Myitkyina-Bhampo highway, parallel to the Chinese border. The KIA has sought to both neutralize threats to their capital and control the trade and movement along the highway.

The military has responded with a spasm of air and artillery assaults into Lai Zar, the seat of the KIA’s headquarters. The KIA is now on the outskirts of Myitkyina, the capital and economic hub of Kachin state.

The KIA’s offensive deserves close attention for five reasons.

First, although the KIA was one of the first ethnic resistance organizations to join with the National Unity Government (NUG) and fight the junta after the Feb.1, 20921 coup d’etat, they have been less militarily active since the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched a coordinated offensive on Oct. 27, 2023 that has turned the tide against the junta in Shan state. 

The Three Brotherhood Alliance – which includes the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army – took towns across northern Shan state. 

In November, the Arakan Army broke their ceasefire with the government and swept across northern Rakhine. The AA is now in control of six townships, and is advancing on the capital. The military government is quickly trying to evacuate civil servants and some forces from Sittwe.

Shan ceasefire

In early January, China brokered a ceasefire between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known. 

The ceasefire in northern Shan State has largely held, and both the TNLA and the MNDAA have been focusing on consolidating power in the townships that they captured, imposing law and order, and providing social services.

 

The ceasefire  has allowed the junta to re-group its forces. The military retook Kawlin township in Sagaing after a two week siege. The junta has recently declared martial law in two KIA-controlled and three TNLA-controlled towns in northern Shan, suggesting that they were preparing for a counter-offense and were loosening the rules of engagement for their forces. Now 61 of 330 townships nationwide are under martial law.

Despite a fourth round of Chinese-brokered ceasefire talks from Feb. 29-March 1 that purportedly resulted in a border trade revenue sharing agreement with the MNDAA, the Brotherhood Alliance has more recently signaled that the ceasefire is under threat. 

The opening of a new front is essential to prevent further counter-offensives by the junta.  The military is now unable to redeploy their forces – already spread thin – from Kachin to Sagaing, Rakhine, or other fronts.

The KIA steps up

Secondly, the KIA’s offensive also matters for harmony among the opposition forces, where there is some frustration that the KIA, which has close relations with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, had largely sat out the Operation 1027 offensive over the past four months. 

Fairly or unfairly, carping about the KIA had started to emerge, and critics saw them as not participating sufficiently in Operation 1027, which has fundamentally reshaped the anti-military Spring Revolution’s trajectory.

It’s not that the KIA has not been fighting. In February, airstrikes in Mansi, a town the KIA captured, left six dead. The past week has seen intense fighting between them and junta forces around the economically important jade mining town of Hpakant. 

Criticism of the KIA is not entirely fair. The KIA fought in northern Shan state, taking two towns and other military bases. But some saw the KIA’s presence as a power grab that caused tensions with the local Ta’ang community; despite the close ties between the TNLA and KIA.

Third, the KIA has reportedly damaged at least one Mi-17 helicopter at Myitkyina airport. This further dents the air force’s overtaxed fleet of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. 

To date, six other aircraft have been destroyed, including a MiG-29 that crashed on March 1, apparently due to technical malfunctions. The loss of additional heavy-lift aircraft will hurt junta military logistics. 

Already the military has shown severe strains in maneuver and resupply, including in Rakhine where the Arakan Army has recently sunk four naval troop carriers. In other parts of the country, helicopters are absolutely essential for military sustainment. 

Interviews with defecting junta troops have made clear that the SAC’s inability to resupply troops with ammunition, food, and water – while ferrying in reinforcements and carrying out wounded soldiers – has led to plummeting morale. 

China border

As we have seen in both Rakhine and Shan states, the light infantry battalions that have surrendered are severely undermanned, prompting conscription. 

Recently, the military leadership ordered family members of troops to be deployed to frontline outposts. Pictures emerged on social media of wives in foxholes. This was designed to both shore up the depleted manpower, but also motivate the troops to fight and hold their positions at all costs. 

Unsurprisingly, it has had just the opposite effect, with troops surrendering in order to save the lives of their family members, and often at the encouragement of their wives.

Fourth, although the KIA is leading the offensive it includes an allied ethnic resistance organization as well as people’s defense forces from the shadow opposition National Unity Government (NUG). Joint operations are essential in building up trust between these organizations.

Finally, during the junta’s bombardment of Lai Zar, which sits on the border, at least four military artillery shells landed in Chinese territory, destroying several buildings. The military denied firing the shells and blamed the KIA. 

While they could have hit China inadvertently because of the poor quality of their troops, it is more likely that the attack was intentional, and done to force China to pressure the KIA into a ceasefire.

Kachin State remains a complex place with its own inter-ethnic tensions. The recent fighting led to the death of a well-known and charismatic ethnic Lisu politician who ran a pro-junta militia. 

The Lisu, a very small minority group, looked to the junta for protection. The NUG and their ethnic army allies need to quickly reach out to these groups and offer them assurances.

It’s too soon to determine whether the KIA offensive can be sustained. China is insistent on peace along its border. While the KIA has Chinese backing, it also has agency. 

Whether it has the will to broaden the offensive and keep the junta bogged down across eight distinct military fronts, remains to be seen. But it is a new front that the beleaguered military leadership can ill-afford.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia.