Day: March 24, 2024

On March 20, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam voted to accept the resignation of President Vo Van Thuong, capping the spectacular downfall of a once-promising new leader that underscores the risks of Hanoi’s anti-corruption campaign. 

The following day, an extraordinary session of the National Assembly accepted his resignation but failed to elect his successor. Vice President Vo Thi Anh Xuan will serve as the acting president until the National Assembly elects a president. 

There’s no sign that Thuong will be the last scalp in an anti-corruption campaign that has toppled a slew of senior leaders in the one-party state in recent years.

The dismissal of two deputy prime ministers, two presidents and one other Communist Party of Vietnam Politburo member, as well as other ministers and former ministers, since December 2022 undermines Vietnam’s selling point of political stability and rattled markets. 

Rumors of Thuong’s downfall began on March 14, when the Netherlands announced the postponement of a March 19-22 visit by the Dutch royal couple at the request of the Vietnamese government “due to internal circumstances.”

Word quickly emerged that Thuong had submitted his resignation to the ruling party Politburo. 

He is the fourth Politburo member forced to resign since December 2022, bringing the number of members down to 14, the smallest since the Doi Moi economic reform era began in 1986.

Spilling tea on corrupt officials

Thuong has been described by some academics as the party’s ideologue. While he held ideological positions within the party, he was no ideologue. 

It’s true that before becoming the president in March 2023, following the ouster of Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Thuong chaired the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Education Commission, as well as heading the Central Council on Political Thought, a brain trust of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong.

But that was a mid-career reinvention in part to burnish his credentials. He’s not the party ideologue nor apparatchik that some claimed.

From 2011-2014, Thuong was the party chief of Quang Ngai province, before moving to Ho Chi Minh City in 2014. He served as the deputy party chief under Le Thanh Hai, better known as the godfather of Ho Chi Minh City. Little happened in terms of the region’s economic and real estate development without his knowledge and approval.

Despite his leadership role in the freewheeling south, Thuong was brought to Hanoi, in large part, to spill the tea on corrupt party officials, as the central government moved to reassert control. 

In 2016, Thuong was appointed to the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Education Commission. He was elevated to the Politburo in 2020, and joined the Secretariat, which is in charge of the party’s day-to-day operations, in 2021. 

Thuong was clearly being groomed for bigger things. Born in 1970, Thuong was the youngest person on the Politburo, and many pundits had tipped him as being a possible successor to Nguyen Phu Trong as general secretary at the 14th Congress, expected to be held in early 2026. He was also the only southerner amongst the senior leadership.

For a party that is out of touch with Vietnamese youth, choosing a younger general secretary has a certain logic. Even if passed over at the 14th, Thuong would have been well positioned to take over the party at the 15th Congress. In short, his fall is quite spectacular. 

Who brought Thuong down and why?

So who wanted Thuong gone and why? After all, he was often described as a young protege of the powerful party chief, which should have accorded him some protection.  

It’s worth noting that Thuong’s resignation was the result of an investigation dating back to his time in Quang Ngai, from 2011-14, which shows just how far back rivals are willing to dig. 

All eyes quickly fell on Minister of Public Security To Lam.

When the Politburo elected Thuong president in February 2023, not everyone was happy, least of all Lam who may have seen the presidency as a path to whitewashing his own scandals, including being filmed in celebrity chef Salt Bae’s London restaurant eating $1000 gold encrusted steaks after placing a wreath at the grave of Karl Marx.

In April 2023, four Vietnam Airlines flight attendants were arrested in Ho Chi Minh City’s Tan Son Nhut airport for smuggling 11 kilograms (22 pounds) of illegal narcotics. One was rumored to be Thuong’s niece. 

In a country known for the quick dispatch of the death penalty for drug offenses, all four stewardesses were quickly released with a slap on the wrist. The message to Thuong could not have been more clear.

Since Lam’s own scandals appeared to preclude him from contention to be the next general secretary, the presidency would extend his political lifespan, especially if he could ensure that his protege, Deputy Minister of Public Security Luong Tan Quang, succeeded him.  

Lam goes after his own rivals

His predecessor, Tran Dai Quang, after all, continued to keep an office in the security ministry despite becoming president in 2016. Lam expected to continue to wield influence over the powerful ministry in order to keep rivals in check and protect his family’s growing corporate empire.

For years,Trong used Lam and the security ministry to target rival faction members. Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who challenged Trong for the general secretaryship in 2021, was ousted in February 2023. Other leaders tied to former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung have been systematically taken down. 

Increasingly, Lam dispatched his own rivals. 

With Thuong’s dismissal, there are now only three other eligible replacements among members of the Politburo under existing party rules: Secretariat chief Truong Thi Mai, National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh.  

Mai is competent, has broad-based experience, and is relatively clean. But Mai’s already amassed unprecedented power for a woman in the male-dominated world of Vietnamese politics. At 65, she’s also hinted that she has little interest in serving another five-year term. 

Chinh has had numerous corruption investigations surrounding him and has already had to write a self-criticism. Hue is rumored to be under investigation. Should Hue be forced to resign, that would leave Lam as the last man standing. 

The media widely pinned Lam as the likely next president, viewing it as a stepping stone to becoming party chief in 2026. But that is unnecessary and begs the question, why would Lam want the presidency?

‘Four Pillars’

Too often the presidency is described as being a ceremonial post. But it’s one of the “Four Pillars” of the collective leadership, and should the president choose to wield his authority and influence, especially through his patronage networks, it can be a powerful position, as Le Duc Anh (1992-1997) and Truong Tan Sang (2011-2016) proved.  

Nonetheless, the minister of public security has something the presidency doesn’t have: investigative powers. In short, Lam doesn’t need the presidency as a stepping stone to become general secretary if that’s his goal. He can use his current position to keep his rivals on the defensive.

While it’s possible that the National Assembly wouldn’t endorse Lam for the presidency, it’s more likely that he was unable to secure the promotion of his deputy, Luong Tan Quang, to the Politburo, a requirement to become minister. Ergo, the presidency remains in the hands of Vice President Xuan.

We also need to consider an alternative, that someone else brought Thuong down to force Lam into the presidency. 

If Lam was forced out of the security ministry, while his hand-picked successor gets passed over, he would be politically vulnerable to corruption charges.

With the Politburo now down to a decades-low 14 members, repeated central committee plenums since early 2023 have failed to elect replacements, an indication of factional deadlocks. 

Planning for the 14th Party Congress is already underway, with two preparatory sessions on documents and personnel held in February and March. 

Having weaponized anti-corruption, Trong is suddenly unable to contain the campaign, taking down rivals and proteges alike.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia.

On March 20, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam voted to accept the resignation of President Vo Van Thuong, capping the spectacular downfall of a once-promising new leader that underscores the risks of Hanoi’s anti-corruption campaign. 

The following day, an extraordinary session of the National Assembly accepted his resignation but failed to elect his successor. Vice President Vo Thi Anh Xuan will serve as the acting president until the National Assembly elects a president. 

There’s no sign that Thuong will be the last scalp in an anti-corruption campaign that has toppled a slew of senior leaders in the one-party state in recent years.

The dismissal of two deputy prime ministers, two presidents and one other Communist Party of Vietnam Politburo member, as well as other ministers and former ministers, since December 2022 undermines Vietnam’s selling point of political stability and rattled markets. 

Rumors of Thuong’s downfall began on March 14, when the Netherlands announced the postponement of a March 19-22 visit by the Dutch royal couple at the request of the Vietnamese government “due to internal circumstances.”

Word quickly emerged that Thuong had submitted his resignation to the ruling party Politburo. 

He is the fourth Politburo member forced to resign since December 2022, bringing the number of members down to 14, the smallest since the Doi Moi economic reform era began in 1986.

Spilling tea on corrupt officials

Thuong has been described by some academics as the party’s ideologue. While he held ideological positions within the party, he was no ideologue. 

It’s true that before becoming the president in March 2023, following the ouster of Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Thuong chaired the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Education Commission, as well as heading the Central Council on Political Thought, a brain trust of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong.

But that was a mid-career reinvention in part to burnish his credentials. He’s not the party ideologue nor apparatchik that some claimed.

From 2011-2014, Thuong was the party chief of Quang Ngai province, before moving to Ho Chi Minh City in 2014. He served as the deputy party chief under Le Thanh Hai, better known as the godfather of Ho Chi Minh City. Little happened in terms of the region’s economic and real estate development without his knowledge and approval.

Despite his leadership role in the freewheeling south, Thuong was brought to Hanoi, in large part, to spill the tea on corrupt party officials, as the central government moved to reassert control. 

In 2016, Thuong was appointed to the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Education Commission. He was elevated to the Politburo in 2020, and joined the Secretariat, which is in charge of the party’s day-to-day operations, in 2021. 

Thuong was clearly being groomed for bigger things. Born in 1970, Thuong was the youngest person on the Politburo, and many pundits had tipped him as being a possible successor to Nguyen Phu Trong as general secretary at the 14th Congress, expected to be held in early 2026. He was also the only southerner amongst the senior leadership.

For a party that is out of touch with Vietnamese youth, choosing a younger general secretary has a certain logic. Even if passed over at the 14th, Thuong would have been well positioned to take over the party at the 15th Congress. In short, his fall is quite spectacular. 

Who brought Thuong down and why?

So who wanted Thuong gone and why? After all, he was often described as a young protege of the powerful party chief, which should have accorded him some protection.  

It’s worth noting that Thuong’s resignation was the result of an investigation dating back to his time in Quang Ngai, from 2011-14, which shows just how far back rivals are willing to dig. 

All eyes quickly fell on Minister of Public Security To Lam.

When the Politburo elected Thuong president in February 2023, not everyone was happy, least of all Lam who may have seen the presidency as a path to whitewashing his own scandals, including being filmed in celebrity chef Salt Bae’s London restaurant eating $1000 gold encrusted steaks after placing a wreath at the grave of Karl Marx.

In April 2023, four Vietnam Airlines flight attendants were arrested in Ho Chi Minh City’s Tan Son Nhut airport for smuggling 11 kilograms (22 pounds) of illegal narcotics. One was rumored to be Thuong’s niece. 

In a country known for the quick dispatch of the death penalty for drug offenses, all four stewardesses were quickly released with a slap on the wrist. The message to Thuong could not have been more clear.

Since Lam’s own scandals appeared to preclude him from contention to be the next general secretary, the presidency would extend his political lifespan, especially if he could ensure that his protege, Deputy Minister of Public Security Luong Tan Quang, succeeded him.  

Lam goes after his own rivals

His predecessor, Tran Dai Quang, after all, continued to keep an office in the security ministry despite becoming president in 2016. Lam expected to continue to wield influence over the powerful ministry in order to keep rivals in check and protect his family’s growing corporate empire.

For years,Trong used Lam and the security ministry to target rival faction members. Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who challenged Trong for the general secretaryship in 2021, was ousted in February 2023. Other leaders tied to former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung have been systematically taken down. 

Increasingly, Lam dispatched his own rivals. 

With Thuong’s dismissal, there are now only three other eligible replacements among members of the Politburo under existing party rules: Secretariat chief Truong Thi Mai, National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh.  

Mai is competent, has broad-based experience, and is relatively clean. But Mai’s already amassed unprecedented power for a woman in the male-dominated world of Vietnamese politics. At 65, she’s also hinted that she has little interest in serving another five-year term. 

Chinh has had numerous corruption investigations surrounding him and has already had to write a self-criticism. Hue is rumored to be under investigation. Should Hue be forced to resign, that would leave Lam as the last man standing. 

The media widely pinned Lam as the likely next president, viewing it as a stepping stone to becoming party chief in 2026. But that is unnecessary and begs the question, why would Lam want the presidency?

‘Four Pillars’

Too often the presidency is described as being a ceremonial post. But it’s one of the “Four Pillars” of the collective leadership, and should the president choose to wield his authority and influence, especially through his patronage networks, it can be a powerful position, as Le Duc Anh (1992-1997) and Truong Tan Sang (2011-2016) proved.  

Nonetheless, the minister of public security has something the presidency doesn’t have: investigative powers. In short, Lam doesn’t need the presidency as a stepping stone to become general secretary if that’s his goal. He can use his current position to keep his rivals on the defensive.

While it’s possible that the National Assembly wouldn’t endorse Lam for the presidency, it’s more likely that he was unable to secure the promotion of his deputy, Luong Tan Quang, to the Politburo, a requirement to become minister. Ergo, the presidency remains in the hands of Vice President Xuan.

We also need to consider an alternative, that someone else brought Thuong down to force Lam into the presidency. 

If Lam was forced out of the security ministry, while his hand-picked successor gets passed over, he would be politically vulnerable to corruption charges.

With the Politburo now down to a decades-low 14 members, repeated central committee plenums since early 2023 have failed to elect replacements, an indication of factional deadlocks. 

Planning for the 14th Party Congress is already underway, with two preparatory sessions on documents and personnel held in February and March. 

Having weaponized anti-corruption, Trong is suddenly unable to contain the campaign, taking down rivals and proteges alike.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia.

After four months in limbo about his refugee status and heavily in debt, Hung has some advice for anyone from Vietnam planning to work in Australia on a tourist visa:

“If you are keen on coming to Australia, you’d better choose a legal way,” said the part-time laborer from Hanoi, who was duped into paying an immigration service company to apply for an entry visa on his behalf.

“Arriving with a student or skilled labor visa is OK, but you should think twice about using a tourist visa,” he said.

For years, Hung made ends meet in Hanoi on a monthly income of 10 million dong (US$400), but was unable to build any savings due to the high cost of living in Vietnam’s capital.

After hearing stories of other Vietnamese landing good-paying jobs while visiting Australia, Hung, who spoke to RFA Vietnamese using a pseudonym due to security concerns, decided to travel the 5,000-odd kilometers (3,100 miles) southeast to try his luck.

He hoped to earn a better salary Down Under – where minimum wage workers earn AU$70,000 (US$48,000) a year, or 14 times the average income in Vietnam – and save money to improve his living standard back home.

Vietnamese who are unable to obtain work visas for Australia are eligible for a Work and Holiday Visa, which allows people to work while traveling in the country for up to one year.

Applicants must be between the ages of 18 and 30, have no criminal record and provide evidence that they have completed at least two years of undergraduate study. They must also show that they can support themselves financially while in Australia and have attained a certain level of English proficiency.

In debt and desperate

Hung, who did not disclose his age, had no employer to sponsor a work visa and was unable to meet either the education or English proficiency requirements for a Work and Holiday Visa. But a Vietnamese immigration services company told him that he could legally work in Australia as a tourist.

Australian tourist visas have a significantly lower barrier to obtain. They are good for three months and can be extended to a full year in special circumstances. However, entrants are not eligible to work during their visit.

Unfamiliar with the application process, Hung took on debt to pay 100 million dong (US$4,000) – a substantial amount for the average Vietnamese laborer – to the immigration services company to handle his visa, as well as purchase an airline ticket, and he flew to Australia in July 2023.

Hung had hoped to live and work in Australia for up to two years, to pay off what he had borrowed in getting there and to build wealth. Instead, by October, his tourist visa was about to expire and he had only accrued more debt while supporting himself for three months in a nation with a vastly higher cost of living.

Increasingly desperate, Hung sought help from fellow Vietnamese through social media, and was advised to apply for an Australian Onshore Protection Visa (Subclass 866) as a political refugee, which would allow him to stay in Australia for longer and work legally.

He paid someone AU$1,000 (US$650) to prepare his application, went to the local immigration department to be fingerprinted, and was granted a bridging visa (BVE 050) that allows him to lawfully reside in the country while awaiting a decision on his status.

While Hung will be required to present evidence of his asylum claim, it is unclear when he will be called for an interview, due to the large backlog of applications.

Topping the list for asylum seekers

According to the Australian Department of Home Affairs, 2,905 Vietnamese nationals applied for the Australian Onshore Protection Visa in 2023, making them the largest ethnic group to do so and accounting for 12% of the total number of applicants.

Vietnamese topped the list of asylum applicants in Australia, beating out Indians and Chinese, in each of the last five months of 2023, and ranked second in three other months last year.

Many of them end up in situations like Hung’s, nervously awaiting a verdict on their claim to learn whether they will be granted residential status or forced to return home.

The bridging visa does not expire and grants holders the right to work and access a national health insurance assistance program so that they can receive medical care in Australia.

However, if asylum status is denied, the bridging visa will be automatically canceled within 28 days, and the holder will be required to leave the country. Those denied status have the right to appeal the decision with an immigration court.

The chances of being awarded political asylum in Australia are fairly low. In 2023, the Australian Department of Home Affairs processed nearly 1,000 asylum applications, of which only 53, or 5.6%, were approved.

The stakes are considerably higher for applicants who have fled persecution in Vietnam, where the one-party communist state brooks no dissent. Being forced to return home can often mean a jail sentence, or worse.

‘Extraordinary surge’ in applications

Vietnamese-Australian immigration attorney Le Duc Minh told RFA that his law firm has helped many “genuine” Vietnamese political asylum seekers successfully apply for status in Australia.

But he acknowledged that he regularly hears stories like Hung’s from people who ended up in debt after trying to work illegally in the country.

“Some people simply ask me, ‘Please find a way for me to stay longer to earn money and pay off my debts. I borrowed hundreds of millions of dong in Vietnam to make this trip. I cannot go home empty-handed,’” he said.

Minh said he was surprised by what he called an “extraordinary surge” in applications by Vietnamese for political asylum in Australia in the second half of 2023.

He said that refugee applications tend to increase after political upheavals or government crackdowns on rights activists, but described last year as “very politically stable” in Vietnam. There were no mass demonstrations and most of the arrests were only of prominent activists and outspoken individuals on social media.

Instead, Minh posited, last year’s surge was likely the result of “large-scale fraudulent activities” in Vietnam, including individuals and companies providing false information about work opportunities for foreigners in Australia in order to sell them forged documents and useless services.

He cited an advertisement from one company claiming that applicants could take advantage of a program in Australia that would allow them to “take agricultural jobs without any expertise or English skills.”

After arriving in Australia only to learn that they would be unable to work or pay off their debts, most feel that they have no other choice but to double down, with applying for political asylum as their only option to stay in the country.

Supporting legitimate claims

Immigration attorney Kate Hoang, the former president of Australia’s Vietnamese community, stressed that “not all asylum applicants [from Vietnam] are those who want to extend their stay.”

Many, she said, were targeted by Vietnam’s government for speaking out about social injustices and were lucky just to have been able to travel to Australia to seek asylum at all.

Hoang urged the Australian government to make changes to the way it processes asylum visas to prevent those without legitimate claims from exploiting the system.

Meanwhile, Hung’s future remains uncertain as he awaits the ruling on his asylum application, and he has come to regret his journey to the southern continent.

“I paid a huge amount of money to come here, so I now have no choice but to work hard to pay off my debts, and I’ll probably just have to return home with nothing to show for it,” he said. “If I could make the decision again, I would never have gone.” 

Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

After four months in limbo about his refugee status and heavily in debt, Hung has some advice for anyone from Vietnam planning to work in Australia on a tourist visa:

“If you are keen on coming to Australia, you’d better choose a legal way,” said the part-time laborer from Hanoi, who was duped into paying an immigration service company to apply for an entry visa on his behalf.

“Arriving with a student or skilled labor visa is OK, but you should think twice about using a tourist visa,” he said.

For years, Hung made ends meet in Hanoi on a monthly income of 10 million dong (US$400), but was unable to build any savings due to the high cost of living in Vietnam’s capital.

After hearing stories of other Vietnamese landing good-paying jobs while visiting Australia, Hung, who spoke to RFA Vietnamese using a pseudonym due to security concerns, decided to travel the 5,000-odd kilometers (3,100 miles) southeast to try his luck.

He hoped to earn a better salary Down Under – where minimum wage workers earn AU$70,000 (US$48,000) a year, or 14 times the average income in Vietnam – and save money to improve his living standard back home.

Vietnamese who are unable to obtain work visas for Australia are eligible for a Work and Holiday Visa, which allows people to work while traveling in the country for up to one year.

Applicants must be between the ages of 18 and 30, have no criminal record and provide evidence that they have completed at least two years of undergraduate study. They must also show that they can support themselves financially while in Australia and have attained a certain level of English proficiency.

In debt and desperate

Hung, who did not disclose his age, had no employer to sponsor a work visa and was unable to meet either the education or English proficiency requirements for a Work and Holiday Visa. But a Vietnamese immigration services company told him that he could legally work in Australia as a tourist.

Australian tourist visas have a significantly lower barrier to obtain. They are good for three months and can be extended to a full year in special circumstances. However, entrants are not eligible to work during their visit.

Unfamiliar with the application process, Hung took on debt to pay 100 million dong (US$4,000) – a substantial amount for the average Vietnamese laborer – to the immigration services company to handle his visa, as well as purchase an airline ticket, and he flew to Australia in July 2023.

Hung had hoped to live and work in Australia for up to two years, to pay off what he had borrowed in getting there and to build wealth. Instead, by October, his tourist visa was about to expire and he had only accrued more debt while supporting himself for three months in a nation with a vastly higher cost of living.

Increasingly desperate, Hung sought help from fellow Vietnamese through social media, and was advised to apply for an Australian Onshore Protection Visa (Subclass 866) as a political refugee, which would allow him to stay in Australia for longer and work legally.

He paid someone AU$1,000 (US$650) to prepare his application, went to the local immigration department to be fingerprinted, and was granted a bridging visa (BVE 050) that allows him to lawfully reside in the country while awaiting a decision on his status.

While Hung will be required to present evidence of his asylum claim, it is unclear when he will be called for an interview, due to the large backlog of applications.

Topping the list for asylum seekers

According to the Australian Department of Home Affairs, 2,905 Vietnamese nationals applied for the Australian Onshore Protection Visa in 2023, making them the largest ethnic group to do so and accounting for 12% of the total number of applicants.

Vietnamese topped the list of asylum applicants in Australia, beating out Indians and Chinese, in each of the last five months of 2023, and ranked second in three other months last year.

Many of them end up in situations like Hung’s, nervously awaiting a verdict on their claim to learn whether they will be granted residential status or forced to return home.

The bridging visa does not expire and grants holders the right to work and access a national health insurance assistance program so that they can receive medical care in Australia.

However, if asylum status is denied, the bridging visa will be automatically canceled within 28 days, and the holder will be required to leave the country. Those denied status have the right to appeal the decision with an immigration court.

The chances of being awarded political asylum in Australia are fairly low. In 2023, the Australian Department of Home Affairs processed nearly 1,000 asylum applications, of which only 53, or 5.6%, were approved.

The stakes are considerably higher for applicants who have fled persecution in Vietnam, where the one-party communist state brooks no dissent. Being forced to return home can often mean a jail sentence, or worse.

‘Extraordinary surge’ in applications

Vietnamese-Australian immigration attorney Le Duc Minh told RFA that his law firm has helped many “genuine” Vietnamese political asylum seekers successfully apply for status in Australia.

But he acknowledged that he regularly hears stories like Hung’s from people who ended up in debt after trying to work illegally in the country.

“Some people simply ask me, ‘Please find a way for me to stay longer to earn money and pay off my debts. I borrowed hundreds of millions of dong in Vietnam to make this trip. I cannot go home empty-handed,’” he said.

Minh said he was surprised by what he called an “extraordinary surge” in applications by Vietnamese for political asylum in Australia in the second half of 2023.

He said that refugee applications tend to increase after political upheavals or government crackdowns on rights activists, but described last year as “very politically stable” in Vietnam. There were no mass demonstrations and most of the arrests were only of prominent activists and outspoken individuals on social media.

Instead, Minh posited, last year’s surge was likely the result of “large-scale fraudulent activities” in Vietnam, including individuals and companies providing false information about work opportunities for foreigners in Australia in order to sell them forged documents and useless services.

He cited an advertisement from one company claiming that applicants could take advantage of a program in Australia that would allow them to “take agricultural jobs without any expertise or English skills.”

After arriving in Australia only to learn that they would be unable to work or pay off their debts, most feel that they have no other choice but to double down, with applying for political asylum as their only option to stay in the country.

Supporting legitimate claims

Immigration attorney Kate Hoang, the former president of Australia’s Vietnamese community, stressed that “not all asylum applicants [from Vietnam] are those who want to extend their stay.”

Many, she said, were targeted by Vietnam’s government for speaking out about social injustices and were lucky just to have been able to travel to Australia to seek asylum at all.

Hoang urged the Australian government to make changes to the way it processes asylum visas to prevent those without legitimate claims from exploiting the system.

Meanwhile, Hung’s future remains uncertain as he awaits the ruling on his asylum application, and he has come to regret his journey to the southern continent.

“I paid a huge amount of money to come here, so I now have no choice but to work hard to pay off my debts, and I’ll probably just have to return home with nothing to show for it,” he said. “If I could make the decision again, I would never have gone.” 

Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.