Day: June 7, 2023

China’s official narrative about the war in Ukraine has embraced three different themes over time that have sent conflicting signals, according to an analysis of state media reports and official foreign ministry declarations.

That reflects Beijing’s competing priorities in the conflict, experts say.

Initially, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Beijing officials sought to present China as a neutral power with no interest in getting involved. But a year later, they started to portray China as taking an active role as a peacemaker. 

Both of those approaches have been at odds with the state media’s coverage of the war, which has been sympathetic to Moscow. It has portrayed the United States and Ukraine as aggressors and Russia as a heroic victim protecting its security, according to a recent joint study by Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) and three research groups.

China’s attempts to play various sides isn’t surprising, experts say. It doesn’t want the war to drag on, but it also doesn’t want to criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin as it needs to keep Russia on its side against the United States and its global allies.

“Beijing doesn’t ultimately benefit from a prolonged war that is destabilizing the global economy and continues to present the potential risk of nuclear escalation and the spread of conflict beyond Ukraine,” said Patricia Kim, a Chinese foreign policy expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

“At the same time, Beijing has been reluctant to curtail its support to Moscow and to sharply push Putin to stop his war, as China is keen to keep Russia on its side as it looks toward long-term competition against the U.S. and its partners,” she said.

First 100 days

A joint study conducted by AFCL, Taiwan’s DoubleThink Lab, the Ukrainian civic organization Detector Media and the research firm IRI Beacon Project shows that the Chinese government has propagated narratives consistent and supportive of Russia’s justification for the war. 

Entitled “The Invasion of Ukraine in One Hundred Days: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and Russian War Narratives,” the study traces common themes observed in both Chinese and Russian narratives during the first 100 days of the conflict and finds that China largely copied Russian narratives portraying itself as a victim heroically opposing the US and the West.

In countries like China that lack a free press, foreign policy statements and state media coverage provide a window into government priorities. 

As the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, state-run media such as Xinhua News Agency, the Global Times newspaper and CCTV are used by authorities for achieving political goals, and are aimed at specific audiences. They may target an international audience, a domestic one or specific countries.

During the first 100 days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese media sought to position the country as a neutral player, shining a spotlight on Western support for Ukraine while downplaying its own ties to Moscow, said Kim.

Yet state-run media coverage clearly sided with Russia. It echoed Russian narratives about three contentious topics: The theory that the United States had a bioweapon lab in Ukraine, the Russian massacre of civilians in the town of Bucha in March 2022 and the ongoing sanctions against Russia, the joint study showed.

It also highlighted alleged divisions between Western institutions and the international community over sanctions against Russia. 

Such views align with those of Moscow, but they also fit with Beijing’s domestic agenda. The Chinese government has sought to portray itself as a victim of Western hostility, too, alleging that the United States is seeking to contain China and its rise as a superpower—a line that Beijing has promoted among its people. 

These narratives contribute to an image of President Xi Jinping as a tough statesman who is willing to stand up to the West.  

Chinese narratives since May 2022 

To examine Chinese narratives about the Ukraine invasion since May 2022, we requested data from Future Media and Disinformation Research Center on how certain keywords ebb and flow in Chinese public discourse.

From May 2022 to February 2023, references to Ukraine or Russia by Chinese media and officials appear to have decreased. However, the number of references then jumped from February to April 2023 – with a new emphasis on China as a peacemaker working to prevent a warmongering United States from prolonging the Ukraine conflict. 

The emergence of this narrative also coincided with a state visit by Xi to Russia in March—his first since the start of his third five-year term last October.

In many cases, this message was disseminated by Chinese foreign ministry officials, who tend to adopt a restrained tone when speaking about more nuanced geopolitical issues surrounding the war. 

P2

China also advocated a peaceful settlement to the war using other channels including several position papers. Xi himself wrote an article published in the Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in which he emphasized China’s role as a “peacemaker.” 

This shift in narrative was followed by a phone call between Xi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, the first direct communication between the two leaders since the war broke out. After the call, China reiterated that its “core position is to promote peace and promote talks.” 

That same day, China voted in favor of a UN General Assembly motion that acknowledged Russian aggression against Ukraine, fueling speculation that Beijing’s position toward the war has changed. 

Despite Beijing’s apparent shift in position, some official media reports have continued to spread the narrative of the United States as aggressor, such as an article published by the Xinhua in February criticizing Washington for “still fanning the flames in Ukraine.” 

ManyChinese articles reporting misleading or controversial statements by Russian officials have been linked to specific incidents, such as U.S. President Biden’s surprise visit to Ukraine in February. One article said that the United States had become a direct participant in the war. Another article characterized Finland’s accession to NATO in April as a “deliberate violation of Russia’s security.” 

Even as China continues to send mixed signals about Russia’s role in the war, pragmatism appears to be pushing Chinese authorities to take a more active part in trying to end the conflict. 

Zelensky’s continued willingness to engage in talks with Xi suggests that Ukrainian leaders remain hopeful that China can play a role in negotiating a peace settlement.

As Kim says, “While Beijing can never be an honest broker, it still has an interest in seeing an end to the war and so it makes sense for Ukraine and other states to encourage China to use its influence constructively vis-a-vis Moscow.”

Additional reporting by Shen Ke. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken will travel to Beijing “in the coming weeks,” according to media reports, but a spokesman for the State Department said that he could not confirm the travel plans.

Blinken on Feb. 4 canceled a scheduled two-day trip to Beijing just hours before he was set to depart Washington after officials said a Chinese spy balloon was found floating over the United States.

State Department officials have since insisted a new trip would take place “when conditions allow,” but refused to provide a timetable. 

However, Bloomberg and Reuters reported Tuesday that Blinken plans to visit China “in the coming weeks” for talks that could include a meeting with President Xi Jinping and other top officials.

“The exact timing for Blinken’s visit is still fluid,” the Bloomberg report said, citing unnamed officials familiar with the matter.

But State Department deputy spokesman Vedant Patel told reporters on Tuesday that he could not confirm the media reports.

“We have no travel for the secretary to announce,” he said, repeating that the trip “will be rescheduled when conditions allow.” 

Thawing relations

Reports of the trip come days after a visit to Beijing by Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and Sarah Beran, senior director for China and Taiwan affairs on the National Security Council, for their own high-level talks.

The State Department said only that it was “to maintain open lines of communication” and Kritenbrink replied “we’ll see” to reporters in Beijing when asked about any trip by Blinken, Reuters said.

Ties between the world’s two major powers have been tense since August, when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan to the protests of Beijing, which regards the democratic island as a renegade province and has vowed to reunite it with the mainland.

Blinken’s canceled trip to Beijing in February was meant to usher in a detente, but that was nixed by the alleged Chinese spy balloon. An unofficial trip by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to New York and Los Angeles in March then further inflamed ties.

There has also been an uptick in near-miss accidents between the two countries’ militaries in the past two weeks in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, with the Pentagon accusing China’s navy and air force of dangerous maneuvering in front of American vessels.

On Wednesday, Adm. Mike Gilday, the chief of U.S. naval operations who last year provocatively said a Chinese invasion of Taiwan this year could not be ruled out, said that he now saw ties with China improving, despite the near-miss accidents in the past few weeks.

“I am encouraged by the most recent turn and dialogue by senior leaders with respect to toning down the, I would say, militaristic tone,” Gilday said at the Brookings Institution. “That’s been helpful.”

U.S. President Joe Biden also said last month he expects relations with China to “begin to thaw very shortly” amid bilateral talks.

In the wake of two recent military near-misses – one in the Taiwan Strait and one in the South China sea – Taiwanese media and other experts suggested that the Communist Party Central Committee has ordered the People’s Liberation Army to implement a new “brinkmanship” strategy.

According to Taiwan’s Upmedia, quoting unnamed “Chinese sources,” the aim of the new strategy is to adopt a “dangerously close” approach to aeronautical and naval near encounters with the United States to force Washington and its allies to back down and avoid military conflict while strengthening nationalist sentiment within China.

Retired Taiwan Air Force Lt. Gen. Chang Yan-ting told Radio Free Asia the encounters were evidence of China “expanding its territory and sphere of influence.”

“This is a long-term trend,” he said. “As its national power increases, it wants to play a bigger role in the international arena.”

“They want the U.S. to make concessions, but no matter how much the U.S. concedes, they will not be completely satisfied,” said Chang.

RFA was unable to confirm that China has intentionally altered its strategy to amplify the risk of escalation in order to deter freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

‘Somebody gets hurt’

But the claim echoes a widely reported White House statement that recent dangerous encounters between American and Chinese forces in the region are increasing and escalating the risk of an error, making it ever-more likely that “somebody gets hurt,” as stated by John Kirby, National Security Council spokesperson, at a press briefing Tuesday.

Kirby said that the intercepts were “part and parcel” of an “increasing level of aggressiveness” by the People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea.

“I sure would like to hear Beijing justify what they’re doing,” Kirby said. “Air and maritime intercepts happen all the time. Heck, we do it. The difference is … when we feel like we need to do it, it’s done professionally.”

Kirby said that if Beijing wanted to tell the United States it was unwelcome in the area – to stop flying and sailing in support of international law – it would not succeed. “It’s not going to happen,” he said.

“This is just part, again, of a growing aggressiveness by the PRC that we’re dealing with, and we’re prepared to address it,” Kirby said at the press briefing, referring to the People’s Republic of China by its official name.

‘Cowboy ship handling’

James Stavridis, a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former supreme allied commander of NATO, called the Chinese maneuvers last week “cowboy ship handling.”

“It was the kind of incident that could easily have led to a collision and multiple deaths,” he wrote in an opinion piece for Bloomberg. “Wars have unfolded over smaller incidents.” 

Stavridis added that China’s rejection of an invitation for a meeting between Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and his Chinese counterpart Li Shangfu at the Shangri-La Dialogue Security Forum in Singapore over the weekend made the risks of an accident happening even greater.

“The US, correctly, is castigating China for refusing to even have a dialog between the defense chiefs; by contrast, China criticized the US for seeking to create a ‘NATO in the Pacific,’ which is nonsense. Both sides appear to be talking past each other.”

As early as 2021, Orville Schell, director of the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, speaking to CNN, warned that without sufficient communication, eventually a mistake was inevitable.

“They’re headed towards a train wreck here,” he said, adding, “There’s no mechanism to deal with these – there’s no red phone, there’s no [leading] groups, there’s no protocol, there’s nothing.”

Edited by Mike Firn and Malcolm Foster.

The Chinese government is paying Tibetans 100 yuan (about US$14) each to attend visits and receive blessings from the man Beijing has tapped as Tibetan Buddhism’s second-most important spiritual leader behind the Dalai Lama, residents in Tibet told Radio Free Asia.

Gyaltsen Norbu is the Chinese-backed Panchen Lama, and he is touring parts of the region to give his blessings – but many Tibetans consider him to be an imposter.

Tibetan Buddhists believe that the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama are reincarnated as children when they die. After the 1950-51 Chinese invasion and annexation of Tibet, Beijing has made an effort to influence Tibetan affairs including the selection of a spiritual successor to the 10th Panchen Lama who died in 1989..

In 1995, the exiled Dalai Lama chose 6-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima to be the 11th Panchen Lama, recognizing him as the reincarnation of his predecessor.

The Panchen Lama’s responsibilities include leading a council of high lamas to find the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama after the current one dies.

The 1995 recognition of the 11th Panchen Lama by the 14th Dalai Lama angered Chinese authorities, who three days later took the boy and his family into custody. They have since disappeared.

Beijing then installed another boy, Gyaltsen (in Chinese, Gyaincain) Norbu, as their own candidate in his place.

Unpopular choice

The Panchen Lama installed by Beijing remains unpopular with Tibetans both in exile and at home because he is perceived as someone foisted on them by Beijing.

Beijing is giving out a small monetary incentive for people who receive his blessing, a Tibetan resident told RFA’s Tibetan Service.

“The Chinese government has told the local Tibetans that anyone who attends and receives Gyaltsen Norbu’s blessings will be rewarded with 100 yuan,” the resident said. “The Chinese government has also put in lots of effort to stage Norbu’s visit in Lithang and Bathang as a very grandiose and popular event.”

The resident said that Gyaltsen Norbu recently completed a tour to Gyalthang (Shangri-La, in Chinese Xianggelila), Lithang (Litang), Bathang (Batang), Markham (Mangkang) and Dhapa (Daba) County in Tibet, where he visited the Gyalthang Sumtsen monastery and Lithang monastery.

China’s communist leaders are using Gyaltsen Norbu to push their political agenda, said Namrata Hasija, a Research Fellow at the New Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and Strategy.

“The Chinese government’s effort and attempt in forcing Tibetans into embracing Gyaltsen Norbu has gone futile because other than just a Buddhist monk Tibetans don’t consider and revere him as the Panchen Lama,” she said. 

The visit is the third by the Chinese-backed Panchen Lama and the atmosphere is slightly different from his last visit in 2021, another resident said.

“In July 2021, Tibetans were forced to attend and receive his blessings and there were tight restrictions in those areas where he was,” the second resident said. “Restrictions are not as severe this time compared to his last visit and also there were only a handful of Tibetans who went to see Gyaltsen Norbu in Bathang and Lithang.”

Translated by Tenzin Dickyi. Written in English by Eugene Whong.