Day: October 23, 2022

The first plenary session of the party’s 20th Central Committee re-elected Xi to the post of general secretary, breaking with decades of political precedent by granting him a third term after his predecessors were limited to two.

Former Shanghai party chief Li Qiang has succeeded outgoing economic reformer Li Keqiang as Xi’s second-in-command and therefore most likely candidate for premier, while Xi stalwarts Zhao Leji and Wang Huning remain in the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee.

They have been joined by newly promoted former Beijing party chief Cai Qi, former party general office director Ding Xuexiang and former Guangdong party chief Li Xi, all of whom were formerly members of the Politburo.

Xi also revealed an all-male politburo for the first time since 1997, following the retirement of former vice premier Sun Chunlan. No woman has ever sat on the Politburo Standing Committee.

All but Li Xi have previously worked under Xi as he made his way up through party ranks, either in Zhejiang or Shanghai, and were promoted after that point, indicating that it was his favor that propelled their careers.

The party congress also amended the Communist Party’s constitution to enshrine Xi and his personal brand of political ideology as a “core” leader, giving Xi free rein to take China in whichever direction he chooses, analysts told RFA.

No obvious successor

Former 1989 student protest leader Wang Dan said there is nobody with enough of their own political capital to serve as an obvious successor to Xi. 

“It’s obvious looking at the line-up that Xi will also want a fourth term,” Wang told Radio Free Asia. “He has made no arrangement whatsoever for a successor.”

“There won’t even be a fourth term: he’s going to do this until he dies,” he said.

Xi himself was clearly identified as a successor to president Hu Jintao, under whom he served as vice president for five years before taking the reins of the party at the 18th congress in 2012. Xi’s third term as president will likely be confirmed at the National People’s Congress annual session in March 2023.

Chinese political commentator Chen Daoyin said Li Qiang forms the cornerstone of Xi’s power in the new leadership line-up.

“It could be said that Xi Jinping has absolute trust in him, and that Li Qiang is absolutely loyal to Xi Jinping,” Chen told RFA. “This absolute loyalty manifests itself in his absolute implementation of Xi’s political line.”

“Li Qiang has been widely criticized internationally for the damage he caused with the Shanghai lockdown, but his unwavering implementation of Xi’s zero-COVID policy reflects his loyalty,” he said.

Rare protests at home and abroad

Xi’s smooth transition to an unprecedented third term in office has been marked by rare public protest, including against his zero-COVID policy, both at home and overseas. 

On the eve of the congress, a lone protester dubbed “Bridge Man” unfurled a banner with anti-Xi slogans on a highway overpass before quickly getting carried off by police. Chinese authorities were quick to shut down social media accounts circulating images of the banner, but photos and videos of the incident got wide attention among Chinese living overseas.

On Sunday, Hong Kong protesters converged in London, using the slogan “Not my president!” and showing placards with Xi crowned as emperor, to protest the beating of fellow activist Bob Chan by Chinese consular staff in Manchester earlier this month.

But analysts said the new line-up means Xi is highly likely to continue with the highly authoritarian style of government already developed during his past 10 years at the helm.

“This is digital totalitarianism with Chinese characteristics,” Chen Daoyin said. “He will have far greater enforcement powers than during the Mao era … [and can] achieve a state of total and absolute control and security.”

“[China’s more aggressive] ‘wolf warrior’ foreign policy is unlikely to change,” he said.

Feng Chongyi, an associate professor at the University of Technology in Sydney, agreed.

“Cai Qi, Li Qiang, Ding Xuexiang and Wang Huning are all basically his stenographers,” Feng said. “They have no ability or experience when it comes to running the country.”

“Their main selling point is that they execute Xi’s orders at all costs,” Feng said, citing Cai Qi’s mass evictions of migrant worker communities in Beijing, and Li Qiang’s “messing up China’s most economically developed city.”

Feng said the current Politburo standing committee lacks anyone with the technical knowledge to manage the economy.

“This shows that [Xi] no longer cares about such things,” he said.

Feng said Xi is fully expected to break with the past four decades of economic reform and opening up begun by late supreme leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979.

“It was [former premiers] Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao who really understood the economy, who steered economic growth, and enabled Xi Jinping to realize his dream of power,” he said. “But now he wants to go back to the ‘common prosperity’ of the Mao era, robbing the rich to help the poor: not creating wealth but destroying it.”

“There is now a much greater risk of economic collapse,” Feng said.

Hu Jingtao escorted out

Feng said former President Hu Jintao’s peremptory dismissal from the dais at the 20th party congress on Saturday was likely linked to his finding out that his only ally, Hu Chunhua, wouldn’t be on the Politburo standing committee.

A confused-looking Hu Jintao was physically lifted from his seat by a security guard and firmly escorted from the dais, while attempting to engage Xi in conversation.

“Hu Jintao insisted on attending the closing session of the Party’s 20th National Congress, despite the fact that he has been taking time to recuperate recently,” state news agency Xinhua said in a tweet about the incident.

“When he was not feeling well during the session, his staff, for his health, accompanied him to a room next to the meeting venue for a rest. Now, he is much better,” it said.

Wang Dan said the “total withdrawal of economic technocrats” from the new leadership team was striking.

“This means that the Cultural Revolution is coming,” Wang said in a reference to more than a decade of political turmoil under Mao Zedong from the late 1960s until the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976.

“Economic development will no longer be the main focus,” he said. “There isn’t a single member of the Politburo standing committee who has held a long-term economic portfolio.”

“Instead, struggle will be the focus, because these are all party-builders,” Wang said. “Li Qiang’s appointment sends a very strong message … that [Xi] doesn’t care about someone’s record, only about their loyalty.”

“Even Mao Zedong [only] had a portion of his officials who were truly loyal to him; Xi’s are his minions,” he said.

Independent scholar Wen Zhigang said “political struggle” will now replace economic prosperity as the main party line, as the concept has been written into the newly amended CCP charter.

“[The CCP] has replaced the philosophy of economic construction of the past four decades with the philosophy of [political] struggle,” Wen told RFA. “This will be the new party line and the new program, which is why Li Keqiang and all the other heirs to Deng Xiaoping’s economic development line have all been purged.”

Wen said political purges will likely intensify within party ranks, along with growing attacks on the private sector. China’s foreign policy will become less easy to predict, and involve a standoff with U.S. power and influence in the Taiwan Strait and Western Pacific region.

“Taiwan can’t avoid war”

Xi’s new term in office begins amid growing concern that he will make good on his threat to annex the democratic island of Taiwan by military force, and sooner rather than later.

“From the perspective of Xi’s new team, resolving the Taiwan issue will be the central task, and the most important task of the next 5-10 years,” Wang said.

“Taiwan can’t avoid war … the most important thing is to prepare for it.”

Taiwan has never been ruled by the Communist Party, nor formed part of the People’s Republic of China, and its 23 million people have no wish to give up their sovereignty or their democratic way of life, according to recent opinion polls.

British writer Hao Wang said Xi is unlikely to want to talk to the Taiwanese government, as Beijing has ruled out negotiating with Taipei on an equal footing.

“Xi Jinping doesn’t want to talk to Taiwan; he just wants minions who will enforce his will and his fifth column [of Party  infiltrators] there to comply with his directives.” Wang told RFA. “It’s about the one-way execution of the emperor’s will.”

Wang said Taiwan doesn’t seem worried enough despite global perceptions that the country is in danger.

“It’s time to stop imagining and move to immediate action,” he said.

The Communist Party also renewed Xi’s post as chairman of the Central Military Commission and listed his new vice chairmen as Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, a veteran of the People’s Liberation Army’s 31st Army in the southeastern province of Fujian, across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan.

“He Weidong and Zhang Youxia … are both from the army, so no balance has been struck between the different branches of the military,” Wang said. “These are purely political [appointments].”

“He Weidong is a military commander who has been in charge of the Fujian frontline for a long time and has carried out operations against Taiwan,” he said. “Zhang Youxia … someone with combat experience in Vietnam, has been brought in alongside him, which would greatly enhance any military deployment or use of force against Taiwan.”

Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.

The Chinese Communist Party wrapped up its 20th National Congress at the weekend, granting an unprecedented third five-year term to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. Xi, 69, is set to have his term as state president renewed by the rubber-stamp National People’s Congress in March. RFA asked experts on key aspects of China for their impressions of the congress and expectations of Chinese policies as Xi enters his third term after already a decade at the helm of the world’s most populous nation.

China-U.S. relations and foreign policy

Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and author of The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime:

The bottom line is, the next five years is undoubtedly going to be more rocky for U.S.-China relations and for other countries with security concerns in the region. The issue is not that Xi Jinping really has nailed down the third term. It wasn’t the case that his position was so precarious that he couldn’t be aggressive before. However, it was unlikely that he was going to take moves to start some sort of conflagration that would extend into the party Congress. So the party Congress did serve as a restraint in so far as it was useful to wait until afterwards to take any more aggressive actions against Taiwan, for example. But the reason it didn’t happen previously is largely based on China’s military capabilities. Xi Jinping has been relatively clear since he took power in 2013, where his goals were in terms of promoting territorial integrity, is trying to define that and resolving a lot of these territorial issues, enhancing their position in Asia to regain their standing as a great power.

The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and a dominant position in Asia of which it had previously been decided not only by Xi, but by strategists, analysts and pundits ever since. [Former President Barack] Obama mentioned in his State of the Union that he wouldn’t accept the United States as number two. It had already been decided that there was going to be conflict with the United States if China wanted to be number one in Asia. And so Xi Jinping has been on a trajectory, China has been on a trajectory that’s been relatively consistent, that includes an improvement in military capabilities and thus a heavier reliance on those capabilities to achieve their goals over time. So with the frequency and intensity of competition and conflict, the general trend is that it increases over time.

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii and author of Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security:

At least two messages from the CCP’s 20th Party Congress bode ill for China-U.S. relations.  The first is that a shift in the international balance of power creates an opportunity for China to push for increased global influence and standing.  This is a continuation of a reassessment reached late in the Hu Jintao era, and which Xi Jinping has both embraced and acted upon. 

There is no hint of regret about Chinese policies that caused alarm and increased security cooperation among several countries both inside and outside the region, no recognition that Chinese hubris has damaged China’s international reputation within the economically developed world, and no sense that damage control is necessary due to adverse international reaction to what has happened in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.  Instead, Beijing seems primed to continue to oppose important aspects of international law, to resist the U.S.-sponsored liberal order, and to extoll PRC-style fascism as superior to democracy.  This orientation portends continued if not increasing friction with the United States on multiple fronts, both strategic and ideological. 

Secondly, while the Congress expressed optimism about China’s present course, it evinced increased pessimism about China’s external environment, especially what Chinese leaders call growing hostility from the United States.  Not long ago, PRC leaders perceived a “period of strategic opportunity” within which China could grow with minimal foreign opposition.  Increasingly, however, PRC elites seem to believe that alleged U.S. “containment” of China will intensify now that the power gap between the two countries has narrowed and China has become a serious threat to U.S. “hegemony.”

PRC efforts to undercut U.S. strategic influence, especially in China’s near abroad, will continue.  Beijing will try to draw South Korea out of the U.S. orbit, and may wish to do the same with Japan and Australia, although in those cases it may be too late.  Beijing will continue to try to establish a Chinese sphere of influence in the East and South China Seas, while laying the groundwork for possible new spheres of influence in the Pacific Islands, Africa and Central Asia.

Human rights

William Nee, Research and Advocacy Coordinator at China Human Rights Defenders:

To some extent, the 20th Party Congress will not see any dramatic break from what is happening thus far–and that’s exactly the problem. China is experiencing a human rights crisis: human rights defenders are systematically surveilled, persecuted, and tortured in prison. There are crimes against humanity underway in the Uyghur region, with millions of people being subjected to arbitrary detention, forced labor, or intrusive surveillance. The cultural rights of Tibetans are not respected. And now, Xi Jinping’s ‘Zero-COVID’ policy is wreaking havoc on China’s economy, and particularly the wellbeing of disadvantaged groups, like migrant workers and the elderly.

But there have been no signs whatsoever that the Communist Party is ready to course correct. Instead, after the 20th Party Congress, we will see a new batch of promotions, with these Communist Party cadres more indebted to Xi Jinping’s patronage for their positions of power. In other words, Xi Jinping will have created an incentive structure in which these sycophantic ‘yes men’ will only repeat the ‘thoughts’ of the idiosyncratic leader to prove their loyalty. This makes it even more unlikely that Xi or the Communist Party will even see the necessity of a human rights course correction after the 20th Party Congress, let alone be bold enough to enact changes.

Uyghurs

Sean Roberts, associate professor of international affairs and anthropology at George Washington University and author of The War on the Uyghurs: China’s Campaign against Xinjiang Muslims:

It’s clear that the present policy in the Uyghur region that has been so devastating for Uyghurs is something that Xi Jinping was very much involved in formulating. And in that context, it’s hard to see that his continued rule is likely to be positive for Uyghurs. I have long suggested that in order to resolve this problem it’s going require a major reckoning and a mea culpa to the Uyghur people about what has happened. And I cannot see any way that that would happen. With Xi Jinping still as leader because he can’t really blame this policy on anyone else. It’s been well documented that he has been part of pushing the policies and he has continually defended them in his speeches and in his addresses to the international community. So I don’t see his continued rule being a positive thing for the Uyghurs in China.

Tibet

Nyiwoe, Researcher at the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy:

During Xi’s second term since 2016, the policies of Sinicization and forced cultural assimilation have been at their most aggressive comparatively. In recent years, Tibetan writers and people influential in academics and culture, and younger generations in Tibet, have been arrested and imprisoned under the allegation of being ‘national security’ threats.

China-India relations

Kalpit A. Mankikar, China researcher with the Strategic Studies program at Observer Research Foundation, an independent global think tank based in Delhi, India:

There is kind of a dissonance that we see. So on one hand, I know talking about peace publicly and globally. On the other hand, you have Xi Jinping internally talking about a rich nation, strong army. You also have a certain kind of a mobilization of people in China, because there is a certain level of militarism that Xi Jinping is trying to instill in society. Now, given these ramifications, I think one has to be very vigilant because look at it: It is the weaponization of history, the weaponization of the historical narrative that Russia is using to justify its war in Ukraine. And when China says that it is not expansionist, it is implicit in this argument that it is only trying to take back what belongs to it.

Kanwan Sibal, retired career diplomat, former Indian Foreign Secretary:

If you look at the tenor of his speech in terms of where he wants to take China in his ambitions, there is no stepping back from the policies that he has pursued so far and which has led to many issues both within and outside China. So if he’s going to be very tough with regard to his views and thinking, which we already know, and within the power structure, there is no opposition now to what he intends to do and what his policies are, then this will automatically, automatically get reflected in his dealings with the outside world, and which would include India.

One might have actually reasoned that part of the reason why Xi Jinping was following hostile policies towards India, or unfriendly policies towards India, was because he had to show his muscle in order to consolidate power within the system, and that there might have been voices within the system which advocated a more open approach, a relatively more open approach, and with India in terms of ensuring that the relationship doesn’t go downhill completely. But now that he has acquired full power, he’s going to challenge the United States. And if he’s going to challenge the United States, automatically he will challenge India.

Economic reform

Dexter Roberts, senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Asia Security Initiative and author of The Myth of Chinese Capitalism: The Worker, the Factory, and the Future of the World:

The content of X’s speech is indicative of this attitude that the economy comes second. There’s this new attitude that other things are more important. I think Xi Jinping not only does not care as much about economic growth, I also think, frankly, that he really doesn’t understand the economy. He doesn’t really understand basic economic principles–unlike who clearly does, but is certainly on his way to retirement.

I call Xi’s approach to the economy, ‘Xi Jinping’s politics in command economy,’ and what we’ve seen over the particularly over the last couple of years is almost a disregard for a healthy economy. Instead. Xi Jinping very much puts his ideology above that. And we see areas that arguably really needed attention and definitely needed attention, like dealing with leverage in the property sector and in the economy that perhaps wasn’t managed that well because it dramatically slowed the real estate sector, which is responsible for about a third of GDP. And then we’ve seen in other areas, where it just seemed it wasn’t something that anyone thought or could see as a priority, for example, he cracked down on private education and basically wiped out this flourishing industry that was providing tens of thousands of jobs for smart, young Chinese people to teach English or teach math or teach Chinese or whatever. And he basically wiped it out with a little concern for the economic consequences.

One of the primary challenges is soaring youth unemployment — around 20 percent, something which China hasn’t seen in a very, very long time. Well, wiping out that sort of private tutoring and education sector was a direct blow to youth employment. Cracking down in a very heavy-handed fashion on the larger tech sector and some of China’s wealthiest tech entrepreneurs– people like Jack Ma and others also–without question contributed to growing youth unemployment.

So I think Xi Jinping, if you look at his record over the last, decade, the priority has been, as it is in sort of all aspects of life, to have tighter Communist Party control over the economy and over the private sector. This is not new. In 2016, he commanded entrepreneurs to love the Communist Party. And from then on he’s said that repeatedly, and he’s pushed to put Communist Party cells into private companies and then more recently, basically threatened some of the richest private entrepreneurs in China that they needed to line up and put large amounts of their money into some of his signature policies, like common prosperity, for example.

 Additional reporting by RFA Tibetan and Uyghur.

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN– Brunei is categorised as the second lowest disaster risk country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in the World Risk Index 2022 report, a local newspaper said, yesterday.

According to the paper, World Risk Index 2022, covers risks from earthquakes, floods, hurricanes/typhoons, (both coastal and riverine), drought, sea-level rise, tsunamis, and conflict.

The report ranked Brunei 165th out of 193 nations and regions with a score of 1.34 out of 100.

The Philippines was first in risk among 193 countries and regions, with a scoring of 46.82, followed by India, Indonesia, Colombia and Mexico in the top five.

In ASEAN, Indonesia had the second highest risk (41.46), followed by Myanmar (35.49), Vietnam (25.85), Thailand (20.91), Malaysia (14.36), Cambodia (8.42), Laos (2.91), Brunei, and Singapore (0.81).

Source: NAM NEWS NETWORK

TEHRAN– Iranian Foreign Minister, yesterday said, his country received a U.S. message expressing American hastiness to reach the nuclear deal with Iran.

“Three days ago, we received a message from the U.S., we told them, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s accusations against Iran’s nuclear programme should be resolved,” before any agreement, said Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, in the Armenian capital, Yerevan.

Asked about U.S. officials’ comments about the nuclear negotiations being off the U.S. agenda, he said, “Americans are contradictory in their words and behaviour, as they are in a hurry to reach the agreement in their (recent) message.”

While the U.S. continues to exchange messages with Iran, they “are seeking to exert political and psychological pressure (on Iran) and want to gain concessions in the negotiations,” he said.

“We do not give any concessions to the American side, and we move within the framework of logic and the framework of an agreement that respects the red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but at the same time, we never leave the negotiating table,” he stressed.

Iran signed the nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with world powers in July, 2015, agreeing to curb its nuclear programme, in return for removing sanctions on the country. However, Washington quit the agreement and reimposed unilateral sanctions on Tehran, prompting the latter to drop some of its commitments under the pact.

Source: NAM NEWS NETWORK

President Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful leader in decades, increased his dominance when he was named Sunday to another term as head of the ruling Communist Party in a break with tradition and promoted allies who support his vision of tighter control over society and the struggling economy.

Xi, who took power in 2012, was awarded a third five-year term as general secretary, discarding a party custom under which his predecessors left after 10 years. The 69-year-old leader is expected by some to try to stay in power for life.

On Saturday, Xi’s predecessor, 79-year-old Hu Jintao, abruptly left a meeting of the party Central Committee with an aide holding his arm. That prompted questions about whether Xi was flexing his powers by expelling other party leaders. The official Xinhua News Agency later reported Hu was in poor health and needed to rest.

The party also named a seven-member Standing Committee, its inner circle of power, dominated by Xi allies after Premier Li Keqiang, the No. 2 leader and an advocate of market-style reform and private enterprise, was dropped from the leadership on Saturday. That was despite Li being a year younger than the party’s informal retirement age of 68.

Xi and the other Standing Committee members appeared for the first time as a group before reporters Sunday in the Great Hall of the People, the seat of China’s ceremonial legislature in central Beijing.

Xi announced Li Qiang, a former Shanghai party secretary who is no relation to Li Keqiang, was the No. 2 member and Zhao Leji, a member of the previous committee, was promoted to No. 3. The No. 2 committee member since the 1990s has become premier while the No. 3 heads the legislature. Those posts are to be assigned when the legislature meets next year.

Leadership changes were announced as the party wrapped up a twice-a-decade congress that was closely watched for signs of initiatives to reverse an economic slump or changes in a severe “zero-COVID” strategy that has shut down cities and disrupted business. Officials disappointed investors and the Chinese public by announcing no changes.

The lineup appeared to reflect what some commentators called “Maximum Xi,” valuing loyalty over ability. Some new Standing Committee members lack national-level government experience that typically is seen as a requirement for the post.

The promotion of Li Qiang was especially unusual because it puts him in line to be premier despite not having experience as a Cabinet minister or vice premier. However, he is regarded as close to Xi after the two worked together early in their careers in Zhejiang province in the early 2000s.

Li Keqiang is the top economic official but was sidelined over the past decade by Xi, who put himself in charge of policymaking bodies and wants a bigger state role in business and technology development.

Li Keqiang was excluded Saturday from the list of the party’s new 205-member Central Committee, from which the Standing Committee is picked. He is due to step down as premier next year.

Source: Voice of America

The following is a look at the seven men making up the Communist Party of China’s all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee in order of rank.

Three of them are holdovers from the previous body, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, who has received a precedent-breaking third term as party head. The four newcomers are all Xi loyalists, while the exclusion of Premier Li Keqiang and head of the top advisory body Wang Yang are seen as signs that representatives of other factions will no longer be welcome on the top body.

All-powerful leader Xi Jinping

Xi laid down the conditions for his continuation in power with the elimination of term limits. Even before then, he had sidelined rivals and accumulated ultimate authority by assuming the leadership of working groups operating outside the ministries that oversee everything from national security to economic policy. His third term is being hailed as a return to one-man rule after a period of more collegial decision making.

Xi is what is known as a “princeling,” the son of one of Mao Zedong’s comrades in the founding of the People’s Republic who despite falling out of favor returned to implement important economic reforms. Xi Jinping, meanwhile, worked his way through a series of provincial postings until being appointed vice president and then party leader in 2012, and state president in 2013.

Xi, who has a law degree from Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University, has consolidated power through a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, reasserted the role of the state sector in the economy, expanded the military and led ruthless crackdowns on civil rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. He is also known for his glamorous wife, People’s Liberation Army vocalist Peng Liyuan, although the two have traveled little together since the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak.

Shanghai chief Li Qiang

Li Qiang has been party secretary of Shanghai, China’s largest city and financial hub, since 2017 and was parachuted into the Politburo Standing Committee, possibly as a future premier. The Shanghai post is one of China’s most important and was previously held by Xi, former President Jiang Zemin and former Premier Zhu Rongji.

Li, 63, is regarded as being close to Xi after serving under him in Li’s native southeastern province of Zhejiang, a center for export-oriented manufacturing and private enterprise. He headed the province’s political and legal affairs department before being made deputy party secretary and holds an MBA from Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

Li’s reputation was dented by a lengthy COVID-19 lockdown of Shanghai earlier this year that confined 25 million people to their homes, severely disrupting the economy and prompting scattered public protests. While district-level officials were punished as a means of placating public anger, Li was not known to have addressed the difficulties of adhering closely to Xi’s hardline “zero-COVID” policy. His elevation to the Politburo Standing Committee appears to indicate that loyalty to Xi trumps public popularity and competence in governance when it comes to political advancement.

Discipline chief Zhao Leji

Since 2017, Zhao Leji has run the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party’s much-feared body for policing corruption and other malfeasance. That has made him a key figure in Xi’s campaign to bring party members inline that has at times been characterized as a vehicle for eliminating opponents and instilling loyalty. He is now in line to head the National People’s Congress, the largely ceremonial legislature that meets in full session just once a year and whose deliberations are mainly carried out behind closed doors by its smaller standing committee.

Zhao, 65, is seen by some analysts as part of Xi’s “Shaanxi Gang” of figures with family ties to the western province of Shaanxi. Before moving to Beijing, Zhao was party secretary for Shaanxi and, before that, for the remote western province of Qinghai on the Tibetan plateau, where he was born and spent his early career.

Zhao, like Xi, is a second-generation party member and unconfirmed accounts say their fathers were friends. The relationship is seen as having aided Xi in his push to eliminate term limits and continue as party general secretary indefinitely.

Political theorist Wang Huning

Longtime party political theorist Wang Huning, 62, has been a member of the Politburo Standing Committee since 2017 and moves up from fifth position, reflecting his status as one of Xi’s most important advisers. The fourth spot usually goes to the head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the advisory group to the NPC that also oversees non-Communist groupings, religious organizations and minority groups.

Wang, who has a background in academia, has largely been in charge of party ideology as an adviser to a succession of leaders. Unusual for those at the pinnacle of power, he has no experience as a regional governor, party leader or cabinet minister.

Since 2017, he has served as director of the Central Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a relatively obscure body that helps enforce Xi’s policies. He was formerly dean of the prestigious Fudan University law school in Shanghai and a professor of international politics. Wang advocates a strong, centralized Chinese state to resist foreign influence.

Wang is credited by foreign researchers with developing the official ideologies of three Chinese leaders — Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents,” Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Development Concept” and Xi’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era.” He is also the author of the highly critical book America Against America, written after a 1991 visit to the United States, which points to economic inequality and other American social and political challenges.

Beijing party leader Cai Qi

Cai Qi is another newcomer to the Politburo Standing Committee, a talented politician who has a long-established relationship with Xi. As with Xi, Cai worked in the coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, arriving in Beijing in 2016 first as mayor before being promoted to the top spot of party secretary the next year.

His time in office has been more varied and challenging than some of his predecessors. He brought the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics in on time and with relatively little disruption and has carried out Xi’s “zero-COVID” strategy without causing the sort of massive upheaval seen in Shanghai.

Cai, 66, is a Fujian native and considered one of the party’s leading intellectuals, having earned a doctorate in political economy from Fujian Normal University, while also proving himself a competent manager.

Xi confidante Ding Xuexiang

As head of the General Office since 2017, Ding Xuexiang holds one of the most important bureaucratic positions in the party, with sweeping control over information and access to officials. That implies that Xi puts a high degree of trust in him and Ding is often among the few officials attending sensitive meetings alongside the general secretary. That has earned him the sobriquets “Xi’s alter ego” and “Xi’s chief of staff.”

Ding, 60, joined the Politburo in 2017 and has held a variety of posts within the party rather than in government administration. Like Wang Huning, he has never been a governor, provincial party secretary or minister.

Li Xi, head Of industrial powerhouse Guangdong

Li Xi’s elevation to the Politburo Standing Committee appears to come in recognition of his success in promoting integration between Guangdong, with its technology center of Shenzhen, and international finance hub Hong Kong.

Li, 66, has also been named to succeed Zhao Leji as head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, whose activities Xi is bound to take a close interest in. Li’s father was an architect of Shenzhen’s success, which may have endeared him to Xi despite their having no obvious close working relationship.

Li also has the special distinction of having been party secretary of Yan’an, where the party founded its headquarters at the end of the famed Long March to escape Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces. The caves carved from the loess hills where Mao Zedong and other party leaders road out World War II have since become a pilgrimage site for party faithful. He later rose to be deputy Shanghai party secretary and then party secretary of the northeastern rust belt province of Liaoning.

Source: Voice of America