Day: September 7, 2022

A collection of human rights officials on Wednesday said the international community must not ignore the systematic abuses allegedly perpetrated against Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities in northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and repeated a call for the U.N. Human Rights Council to review the charges.

The more than 40 experts, comprising U.N. special rapporteurs, independent experts and members of working groups under the U.N. Human Rights Council, issued their call in response to a damning report issued on Aug. 31 by former U.N. human rights chief Michelle Bachelet, finding that China’s repression of the predominantly Muslim minorities in Xinjiang “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.”

Bachelet, who traveled to Xinjiang in May, issued the overdue report on rights abuses in the region on the day she concluded her four-year mandate as U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The report states that “serious human rights violations” have been committed in Xinjiang in the context of the Chinese government’s application of counter-terrorism and counter-“extremism” policies and practices.

China’s Permanent Mission to the U.N. Office at Geneva dismissed the report, saying it ignored the human rights achievements by people from all ethnic groups in Xinjiang and the damage caused by terrorism and extremism to the human rights of all ethnic groups there.

But the U.N. experts supported the report’s conclusions on abuses in Xinjiang, highlighting the finding that “the extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities … may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity,” according to a news release issued by U.N. Human Rights Special Procedures in Geneva.

The experts also drew attention to the report’s finding of “credible allegations of patterns of torture or ill-treatment, including forced medical treatment and adverse conditions of detention, as well as incidents of sexual and gender-based violence including invasive gynecological exams, and indications of coercive enforcement of family planning and birth control policies,” the news release said.

The experts, who have mandates to report and advise on human rights issues, also repeated a call from June 2020 for the Human Rights Council to convene a special session on China to address allegations of arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and restrictions on movement, freedom of religion and freedom of expression on the premise of national security. 

The Human Rights Council should consider establishing a panel of experts to closely monitor, analyze and report annually on the human rights situation in China, the group of U.N. experts said. They also recommended that the U.N. General Assembly or secretary-general consider the creation of a special envoy.

U.N. member states, U.N. agencies and businesses should demand that China fulfills its human rights obligations, the experts said.

Since 2017, Chinese authorities have ramped up their repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities, arbitrarily detaining up to 1.8 million people in internment camps and committing severe human rights abuses.

Credible reports by rights groups and the media documenting the widespread abuse and repression have prompted the United States and some parliaments of Western countries to declare that the Chinese government’s action amount to a genocide and crimes against humanity.

‘We have to name it’

When asked for comment on the experts’ remarks, Stephane Dujarric, spokesman for U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, told RFA that he had nothing to add to what he said about Bachelet’s report during a regular press briefing on Sept. 1.

At the news conference, Dujarric said Guterres had read the report and that it confirmed what the secretary-general’s position that the Uyghur community in Xinjiang must be respected without discrimination.  

“The secretary-general very much hopes that the government of China will take on board the recommendations put forward in the assessment by the high commissioner for human rights,” he said at the time.

Nury Turkel, chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, a bipartisan and independent federal government body, said he was “thankful” that the U.N. experts are acknowledging an obligation to address the Uyghur issue. 

“This comes years too late, but is a good step forward,” he told RFA. “No member state can say that they didn’t know or can escape the brutal reality of active genocide in China.”

Dolkun Isa, president of the World Uyghur Congress, called the U.N. experts’ calls “highly timely as the U.N. has no excuse not to act in light of the release of the Uyghur report by the U.N Human Rights High Commissioner.” 

Alexis Brunnelle-Duceppe, a member of Canada’s Parliament, said he wanted the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to take a stand for human rights and condemn China for its maltreatment of Uyghurs.

“What I’m asking from this government, the Canadian government, is to … ask the U.N. to send a special envoy to Xinjiang and to stop being weak in front of China when it comes to crimes against humanity, when it comes to genocide,” he told RFA.

Though Canada’s House of Commons voted overwhelmingly in February 2021 to declare China’s repression of the Uyghurs a genocide, the country’s government has not issued that determination.

“This is a problem. If you want to solve a problem, you have to name it, and we’re in front of a genocide right now. We have to name it,” he said.

Translated by Alim Seytoff for RFA Uyghur. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

A new decree from Laos’ Prime Ministerial Office further limits personal use of state-owned vehicles among high-ranking officials, the latest effort by Vientiane to root out government corruption.

Decree 599 amends Decree 15, which was issued in September 2021 and forbade officials from using state-owned vehicles after they retire, a popular move among Laotians at that time.

The latest order applies to current office holders. It limits first-tier officials, including the party secretary, president, the chair of the National Assembly, the prime minister, and members of the Politburo, to two state-owned vehicles — one sedan and one SUV — each. It also limits their gasoline allowance to 200 liters (52.8 U.S. liquid gallons) per month.

Officials in the second-tier, like the vice president and vice-chair of the assembly, are allowed two vehicles and 180 liters (47.5 gallons), while third-tier officials such as vice-governors get only one car and 120 liters (31.7 gallons).

“Now, we’re taking inventory of all the state vehicles in the country,” an official of the Finance Ministry told RFA’s Lao Service. This source and others quoted in this report requested anonymity for safety reasons.

“It’s going to take a long time to complete the inventory. We’re counting all kinds of state-owned vehicles including pick-up trucks and vans. The high-ranking officials are not allowed to use these vehicles anymore,” the official said. 

The new decree is the part of Prime Minister Phankham Viphavanh’s “belt-tightening policy,” according to the official. Laos has been trying to very publicly rein in corruption and excess over the past few years.

“On Aug. 30, the Party Central Committee returned six vehicles to the Prime Minister’s Office,” the official said. 

“The party wanted to show a good example to other departments and high-ranking officials that they too should return their excess vehicles, but the Prime Minister’s Office needs more cooperation.”

The official said that the government did not demand the return of excess vehicles last year because of the pandemic. Now that Laos is reopening, they will begin the process, but they need more government agencies to cooperate. He said that some departments say they cannot return all the vehicles deemed to be in excess because they are needed for work.

Several Lao citizens told RFA that they think their leaders have too many cars.

“All members of the Politburo and Party Central Committee have five vehicles each, not just two, and each vehicle consumes 200 liters of gas every month. So, the prime minister should be serious about this problem. He should reclaim the excess vehicles right away,” a Vientiane resident told RFA. 

“Taking back the state vehicles should be a national priority. All leaders at the national level and provincial level should comply with the decree and return the excess vehicles to the state. [It] will save a lot of money.”

The abuse of state-owned vehicles has been a problem for years, another Lao citizen in the southern province of Champassak told RFA.

“All leaders of all levels have too many vehicles. Many of them have more than two and they haven’t returned any of them,” the Champassak source said. “Many high-ranking officials at both the central and provincial levels use their state-owned vehicles for personal use. It’s been like this for years. I’ve heard about reclaiming the cars, but nobody so far has returned them.” 

In the northern province of Luang Prabang, only 10 provincial government officials had returned a single vehicle each, as of Sept. 1, an official there told RFA.

“Most of the department heads still keep their excess cars and don’t show any intention of returning them,” the Luang Prabang official said.

The Prime Minister’s Office resells the vehicles it received in previous reclamations, an official of the office told RFA..

“We’ve sold out on all the luxury cars, like the BMW and Mercedes we got back in 2020 and 2021. As for the vehicles that will be returning this time around, we’ll sell them to the government or party officials at reduced prices.”

Widespread corruption 

During the Sept. 5 episode of the RFA Lao Service’s Weekly News Talk Show, several listeners called in to explain why corruption is so widespread in Laos despite the government trying to eliminate it.

“Corruption is still rampant in Laos because only small fish are punished, and the big fish aren’t. Law enforcement, more specifically enforcement of anti-corruption law, is too weak,” one caller, who requested anonymity, said.

Another caller blamed Laos’ current economic woes on corruption. Laos has billions of dollars of debt that it needs to repay each year to lenders in China, Thailand and Vietnam, officials have said.

“Every government department and every project the government invests in are underwater, heavily indebted,” the second caller said.

“Corruption has been a problem within the Lao government for years and it can’t be solved. Up to now, I’ve never seen any high-ranking officials of the party and the government being punished for corruption. I’ve only heard only low-ranking officials are fired or disciplined,” the second caller said.

A third caller blamed the country’s massive debts on corruption, saying, “ As mentioned in the Parliament, the budget is leaking at all levels, from the bottom to the top. The budget is supposed to be used for the development of the country. When we have no money, the government borrows more and more money from other countries.

“Many Laotians don’t trust the government anymore when it comes to cracking down on corruption because Laos is governed by a single political party to which all members of the government Cabinet and the National Assembly belong,” the third caller said. 

“All they can do is to punish the small fish, then let the big fish swim freely.”

Translated by Max Avary. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

North Korea is seeking Chinese investment to build a solar power plant that would add more capacity to its tapped out electricity grid, government sources in the isolated country told RFA.

North Korea is chronically short on power and rolling blackouts are common, even for privileged people in the nation’s capital Pyongyang. 

Statistics Korea, a South Korean government agency, estimated that the North’s power generation capacity in 2018 was 24.9 billion kilowatts, one-twenty-third that of South Korea. On a per-capita basis, in 2019 only 940 kilowatt hours were available for the average North Korean, about 8.6 percent of the power output available to a typical South Korean, according to the Korea Energy Economics Institute. 

Because Pyongyang is prioritized over other cities, and cities are prioritized over provinces, most North Koreans likely have even less power available.

North Korea’s aging power plants, lack of energy resources and its inefficient transmission and distribution systems are key contributors to chronic power shortages.

To build a new solar power plant, Pyongyang needs investment from China, which it hopes to procure by trading away the rights to sea farms off of the country’s west coast, an official from the capital told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“If Chinese investors provide U.S. $2.5 billion for the construction of the plant, near the West Sea, they will be repaid with a lease on a West Sea fish farm for about 10 years,” he said, using the Korean name for the sea west of the Korean peninsula, internationally known as the Yellow Sea.

The source said that the specifics about repayment would be discussed after the agreement between the two countries is complete.

Cross-border trade between North Korea and China has been on and off again in 2022, after a two-year suspension starting in January 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. Should the border reopen again, North Korea would, according to the plan, hand over the fish farms to China, which would have rights to the fish, eels and shellfish raised on the farms for the next 10 years, the source said.

He said the proposal came from the Second Economic Committee, which coordinates the military defense industry. The proposal documents were faxed from Pyongyang to a Chinese go-between with connections to an investor.

The documents show that North Korea is prepared to lease 12,253 acres of fish farms in return for $2.5 billion for the plant, which would generate 2.5 million kilowatts of electricity per day. 

“The fish farms that would be leased to China are in the West Sea in an area that stretches from Sonchon, Kwaksan and Yomju counties in North Pyongan province to Chungsan county in South Pyongan province. The solar plant would be built near [the city of] Nampo,” the source said.

The proposal is part of an overarching plan by the Central Committee of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party to attract overseas investment, a North Pyongan official told RFA.

Each trade agency under the Cabinet is working to secure wheat imports from Russia and food imports from China, according to the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.

“The biggest of these projects is to hand over fish farms in the West Sea to China and attract investment in the construction of solar power plants,” he said.

Prior to the pandemic, North Korea had already been planning to build solar plants in the western coastal region, according to the second source. Previously the plan was to transfer rare earth mineral mining rights to Chinese developers. 

RFA reported in October 2019 that authorities handed over mineral rights for a mine in Cholsan county of North Pyongan to a Chinese developer in exchange for investment in the same planned solar plant. 

Sanctions intended to prevent North Korea from developing its nuclear and missile programs, however, forbid Pyongyang to export rare earths. Investors in China therefore have not been eager to invest in North Korean rare earth projects so the project never got off the ground.

“We are therefore trying to attract investment from China by handing over the West Sea farms which are not subject to sanctions,” the second source said.

North Korea in 2013 enacted the “Renewable Energy Act,” which would begin Pyongyang’s pursuit of new energy sources like solar, wind and geothermal power.

 Since then, North Korea has continued to import core parts for solar power from China, and has installed solar power in commercial facilities, transportation centers and state-run enterprises to encourage their own electricity production. 

However, the plan to expand solar power in North Korea hit a snag with the coronavirus pandemic and the border closure, sources said. 

RFA attempted to reach the Embassy of China in Washington and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs but received no response.  

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

A former activist who runs a beef noodle stall and is known for imitating a famous Turkish chef who served an expensive cut of meat to a Vietnamese government official was arrested and indicted Wednesday in Danang on a charge of creating and disseminating materials against the one-party communist state.

Bui Tuan Lam, also known as “Onion Leaf Bae,” was charged for violating Article 117 of the country’s Penal Code, which prohibits “creating, storing, and disseminating materials and items against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” state media reported.

Police who investigated Bui said he regularly used social networks to post stories, videos and livestreams with contents “distorting the guidelines and policies of the party and state and promoting activities against the party and state of Vietnam.”

Some of the posted content insulted Vietnamese leaders and the prestige and honor of organizations and individuals, police said.

Officers delivered a summons to Bui at his home on the morning of Nov. 16, 2021, five days after he posted a video on his Facebook account in which he imitated Turkish celebrity chef and restaurateur Nusret Gökçe, a social media star better known as “Salt Bae.”

Salt Bae was recorded on camera in November 2021 hand-feeding a pricey chunk of gold-coated steak at his London restaurant to Vietnam’s minister of public security, To Lam, and his entourage when they stopped there after a United Nations climate change conference in Scotland.

The video was removed from Salt Bae’s TikTok account about 30 minutes after a Vietnamese activist shared it on his Facebook page, though an RFA report on the video caught the attention of followers who wondered how a high-ranking government official could afford a steak that cost 1,450 pounds ($1,975) on a monthly salary of roughly U.S $660.  

In his video clip, Bui refers to himself as “Onion Leaf Bae” and dramatically sprinkles spring onions into a bowl of soup at his noodle stand, mimicking the signature move of the celebrity chef, who writhed ostentatiously as he sprinkled salt on To’s steak.

The order delivered by police did not provide an explanation for the summons, only stating that Bui was to “provide information about a criminal dealing for investigation work,” Bui told RFA at the time. 

A video recording of the visit by Danang police shows two officers refusing to answer Bui when he asked for the reason for the summons. When Bui initially resisted going with the officers, they threatened to forcefully escort him to their office, he said at the time.

Bui, who was born in 1984 and lives in Danang’s Hai Chau district, is known for his human rights activism and charity work. 

Turkish chef Gökçe, 39, owns Nusr-Et, a chain of luxury steakhouses around the world, and videos of his meat-salting performances have been seen and shared by millions of people. When his London eatery opened in September 2021, it was slammed for its U.S. $34 desserts and U.S. $135 hamburgers in the British press, which ran features on exorbitant Salt Bae dinner tabs.

Translated by Anna Vu for RFA Vietnam. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

Senior U.S. officials are traveling to India this week for talks among the so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad.” This grouping compromises Australia, India, Japan, and the United States and is widely viewed as a move by like-minded democracies to contend with an increasingly assertive China and its rising military power. 

Mai Tran of RFA Vietnamese recently conducted an email interview with Nagao Satoru, an expert on U.S.-Japan-India security cooperation who is a non-resident fellow at the Hudson Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. Satoru discussed China’s apparent expansionist strategy in the Asia-Pacific and the security ties that are emerging among rival powers to cope with it. Satoru’s comments have been edited for length.

RFA: What is China’s military strategy in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, and the South China Sea?

Nagao: Beijing’s strategy is to exploit the situation whenever it finds a power vacuum. We can see some examples in the 20th century.

In the 1950s, in the South China Sea, right after France withdrew its troops from Indochina in 1954, China occupied half of the Paracel Islands.

By 1974, one year after the U.S. withdrew from South Vietnam, China immediately occupied the other half of the islands.

In the 1980s, shortly after the Soviet Union reduced its military presence in Vietnam, China expanded its territory in the Spratly Islands, occupying six areas there in 1988.

In 1992, the US Army ended its 92-year presence in the Philippines. And three years later, in 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, administered by the Philippines.

These activities show that China’s strategy is to choose the moment when the military balance shifts and power gaps appear to expand its territory. 

RFA: Does China continue to pursue that expansionist strategy today?

Nagao: If the above historical observation is true, China will continue to escalate its activities because, over the past decade, the military balance has shifted in its favor.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute military expenditure database, from 2011-2020 China increased its military expenditure by 76%. During the same period, India increased its military expenditure by 34%, Australia by 33%, and Japan by only 2.4%. The United States decreased its expenditure by 10%. 

At the same time, China has tried to expand its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Taiwan, the South Pacific, the Indo-China border, and the Indian Ocean because it sees a power vacuum in these areas. In the waters around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, China’s Coast Guard has increased intruding activity from 12 times in 2011 to 819 times in 2013, 707 times in 2015, and 1,097 times in 2019. On the western border, China made 213 intrusions into Indian territory in 2011. It increased the number of intrusions into Indian territory every year: 426 times in 2012, 473 times in 2017, and 663 times in 2019. Since 2019, in the South China Sea, China has continuously intruded simultaneously into the exclusive economic zones of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

RFA: What is the political and military context of the birth of Quad?

Nagao: The strategic goal of the Quad is to re-establish the military balance to end the power vacuums that China is trying to fill. To do this, they need not only to increase their defense budget but also to restructure their own security systems.

Historically, the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region have organized security forces based on the “hub and spoke” model. However, this model is no longer practical for preventing Chinese expansion.

The “hub and spoke” pattern is a grid-like arrangement like a bicycle wheel, in that there is a hub and spokes woven together to keep the wheel steady in motion.

In this “hub and spoke”-based security system, the wheel hub is the United States, and the spokes are U.S. allies such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific. This model is heavily dependent on the U.S. China’s recent expansion shows that the current system is no longer adequate to thwart Chinese expansionist strategy.

Because the current security model does not work well, the United States and its allies have been restructuring the security system based on new linkages. In this new network, U.S. allies and partners work together and share the security burden with the United States and with each other.

That is why recently there have been many multilateral security cooperation agreements, such as U.S.-Japan-India, Japan-India-Australia, Australia-U.K.-U.S., India-Australia-Indonesia, India-Australia-France, and U.S.-India-Israel-UAE. These forms of cooperation are creating a new landscape of security in the region.

In that context, the Quad is just one of many examples of how countries work together and share the burden of regional security when dealing with China, an emerging military power accompanied by worrisome expansionist nationalism.

Defending multiple fronts

RFA: How does the Quad work to deal with China’s expansionist strategy?

Nagao: The Quad’s strategy is to build a game to force China to defend multiple fronts at once. Once the Quad organizes such a network, China must simultaneously allocate defense resources against the U.S. and Japan on the Pacific side as well as against India on the India-China border. Although China has been increasing military spending rapidly, the cooperation of the Quad’s four nations will maintain the military balance. That will make China rethink its ambition so that peace and international order can be maintained.

The ability to attack is the core element of the above game. In the Asia-Pacific, only the U.S. possesses the capability to attack China. If Japan, Australia, and India share the same long-range strike capability, the combined capabilities of all four Quad countries force China to defend on multiple fronts.

In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the establishment of AUKUS, an alliance focusing on helping Australia acquire and maintain eight nuclear submarines. Once Australia has a fleet of nuclear submarines with long-range strike capabilities, the military imbalance today in the entire Asia-Pacific region will change.

Non-Quad countries such as Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and South Korea are also increasing their long-range strike capabilities with surface-to-surface missiles. These factors also contribute to the balance of forces in the region.

RFA: India is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an organization established by China to counterbalance the West. So why did Japan and the U.S. invite India to join Quad?

Nagao: To deal with China, India is needed. Without India, China can concentrate its military power against Japan, the U.S. side.

And India’s stance against China is very strong. There is no Chinatown in India. Such a country is rare in the world. India is the most hawkish country against China.

India’s involvement in SCO, BRICS, etc does not matter. India needs a Central Asia policy including Afghanistan. That is why they need to join. But India does not join the anti-U.S. movement even if they are in these groups.

Opening up the Quad

RFA: South Korea reportedly seeks to attend the Quad summit as an observer in May. Does the Quad have a mechanism to open the door for other countries to join as non-member status? Which countries can join as observers?

Nagao: The Quad is the counter-China group. If South Korea joins, it creates problems.

South Korea has hesitated to show a strong stance against China. China is a formal ally of North Korea, and they (together) fought in Korea. In this case, South Korea cannot play a key role in the Quad if they join.

And if South Korea joins, South Korea wants to talk about the North Korean problem in the Quad meeting. But India is not interested in the issue.

In addition, if South Korea joins, Japan and South Korea will fight each other because there are plenty of problems, including their territorial dispute.

Therefore, if South Korea joins, the Quad will lose its main purpose (to counter China).

South Korea can contribute to the Quad or the Indo-Pacific because South Korea is exporting weapons to strengthen military capabilities in the countries around China. For example, India, Indonesia, Philippines are importing weapons from South Korea. South Korea can contribute to countering China’s strategy case-by-case.

RFA: What strategy does China apply to deal with the Quad? If countries like Vietnam and other ASEAN countries participate in the Quad, how should they participate to get more benefits but not provoke China to attack?

Nagao: Southeast Asian countries need to stop China’s territorial expansion. But at the same time, China’s investment and trade are still influential for Southeast Asian countries. Because Quad-China competition is escalating, in the future, Southeast Asian countries need to choose a side. And finally, the Quad will win the competition against China. Indeed, there was no country that competed with the U.S. that survived (USSR, Japan, Germany). Thus, pro-Quad is beneficial for Southeast Asia … Gradually, Southeast Asian countries can shift their stance toward Quad, but it should not be too provocative against China. That is pro-Quad neutrality.

Charity groups operating in Myanmar’s former capital Yangon are being forced to cut back on their services amid soaring fuel prices, with some groups now entirely closed, sources say.

Ambulances and other emergency vehicles are frequently grounded due to rising costs, said Than Than Soe, chairwoman of Yangon’s Right to Survive Social Assistance Association.

“The cost for fuel is around 60,000 kyat [$28.56] per day,” Than Than Soe told RFA. “We can fill our cars with only 20,000 kyat worth each time, and that should be enough for a trip.

“But sometimes we have to go to places that are quite far away, and we worry that our vehicle might not make it back home.”

Than Than Soe said her group does not ask for set amounts of donations for their help, which can run into costs of from 60,000 to 100,000 kyat per day. “Donors can give as much as they want, and so it’s very difficult for us to operate under this system,” she said.

Khin Maung Zin, secretary of the Myo U Lin Funeral Support Association, told RFA that his group can no longer travel long distances due to rising costs of fuel.

“There are situations where we are asked for free help but are not able to provide it. We just have to say we’re sorry and refuse the requests as our association is low on funds. And we are getting even fewer donations now,” he said.

“In the past, we received around 450,000 kyat [$214.23] per month, but now we don’t even get 200,000 [$95.21]. We even have to be thrifty in covering our office expenses.”

A round trip to Pathein, a city located around 190 km to the west of Yangon, used to cost only 60,000 kyat but now costs around 130,000, he added.

‘Problems, inconvenience’

Also speaking to RFA, Chairman Neyin Gyan of the Happy Taxi Family Charitable Group said that none of Yangon’s more than 270 charity organizations have been able to function effectively since the Feb. 1, 2021 military coup in Myanmar, and half of these have now shut down.

“And we have heard of similar situations with some charity groups in other places, some of which have been temporarily closed,” he said. “This is very unfortunate, because if a charity group in a township stops working, this will cause a lot of problems and inconvenience for that township’s residents.”

Charitable groups don’t want to stop their work, Neyin Gyan said.

“But with the rising costs of fuel and repairs, this has become too much for them. Even for a big group like ours, we now have some debts to settle, but we have managed to keep going.

“If we become too burdened by debt, we will have to stop,” he said.

Myint Kyaing, a resident of Yangon’s Dawbon township, said that poor and needy citizens suffer most when these groups are forced to close.

“People ask these charity groups for help because they have no money, and when the groups can’t help, it is the lower-level workers and the destitute who will suffer,” he said.

“There are many charity groups in this township, but where we could send out 10 cars in the past, we can now send out only three. We’re running our operations now with donations and support from the people who can afford it.”

Social assistance associations formerly provided 24-hour service to Myanmar residents before the coup, but junta authorities then imposed restrictions on travel outside township boundaries and said that ambulances operating without official registration would be seized.

However, charity groups have promised to endure the present crisis and serve the public as much as they can.

Translated by Khin Maung Nyane for RFA Burmese. Written in English by Richard Finney.