Day: October 1, 2021

A Cambodian court on Friday ordered an opposition party activist detained after he returned from exile in Thailand, sending him to Prey Sar Prison in the capital Phnom Penh to face charges of conspiracy and incitement, Cambodian sources say.

Tum Bunthorn, a former commune councilor for the banned Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), was arrested on Wednesday, a month after returning to his home from Thailand in order to live with his family, his wife Sieng Leng told RFA’s Khmer Service.

Sieng Leng said she has not been yet been told of formal charges filed by the Phnom Penh Municipal Court against her husband, but called his arrest politically motivated and unjust.

“I am asking the court to release him so that he can regain his freedom. He needs to feed his children and family,” she said.

Tum Tunthorn was a member of a CNRP musical group that had performed songs criticizing the government of long-ruling Prime Minister Hun Sen, and was jailed for two months in 2019 on charges of incitement amid a wave of arrests of other opposition party activists and politicians.

Fearing further harassment by authorities, he had fled to Thailand following his release.

Speaking to reporters on the Telegram messaging service, Phnom Penh Municipal Court spokesman Plang Sophal said that Tum Bunthorn had been arrested based on a warrant issued after his sentencing in absentia on Dec. 30 to a prison term of two years and eight months for actions “seriously affecting social security.”

Tum Bunthorn’s detention came as the Phnom Penh court questioned a land-rights activist, Lak Kien Ving, who was arrested this week after being summoned to appear at the court, according to his wife, Orn Chantho.

Armed police stormed her house after Phnom Penh deputy prosecutor Mut Dara issued a warrant on Wednesday requesting Lak Kien Ving to come to the court to be questioned over his role in a land encroachment case, she said.

The warrant gave Lak Kien Ving, a resident of Prey Nop district in Sihanoukville, a month in which to appear before the court, but authorities acted quickly to take him into custody, violating the warrant’s own provisions, she said.

Lak Kien Ving’s arrest was not carried out according to law, because the court itself had given him 30 days in which to appear, said Am Sam Ath, deputy director of monitoring at the Cambodia-based rights group Licadho.

Arrests of activists and opposition party members often surge after exchanges of rhetoric between Hun Sen and acting CNRP president Sam Rainsy, who now lives in exile in Paris, Am Sam Ath said.

“In my own observations, I have seen that even when arrest warrants are issued, the authorities often won’t make arrests except in times of political tension. So these arrests have more to do with politics than the law,” he said.

More than 90 political opposition figures and social and environmental activists have been arrested in Cambodia in recent years on charges of “incitement and conspiracy,” sources say.

Also on Friday, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court dropped ten arrest warrants issued against former CNRP youth workers now living in South Korea after one youth leader, Yim Sinorn, wrote to Hun Sen to ask his intervention in the proceedings against them.

The warrants had been issued on charges of conspiracy and incitement over the announced return, later abandoned, to Cambodia by CNRP acting president Sam Rainsy from exile in 2019. On receiving Yim Sinorn’s appeal, Hun Sen forwarded his letter to Cambodia’s Ministry of Justice and the court withdrew the warrants.

Separately, New York-based Human Rights Watch expressed concern over what it called the “repeated harassment” by Cambodian authorities of independent journalist Youn Cheav, who faces a lawsuit filed by Defense Minister Tea Banh because of his reporting on issues of corruption, land grabs, and threats by authorities in southwest Cambodia’s Koh Kong province.

”The persecution of local online reporter Youn Cheav shows how the Cambodian government is systematically silencing the few independent journalists and media outlets left in the country,” said HRW Deputy Asia Director Phil Robertson in a statement Thursday.

“Using the excuse of fighting so-called ‘fake news’ and disinformation, the government is resorting to criminal prosecutions in Cambodia’s politicized court system to target independent journalists based on bogus allegations,” Robertson said.

US lawmakers call for sanctions

Cambodian activists and opposition figures this week applauded the bipartisan passage by U.S. lawmakers on Tuesday of legislation calling for sanctions on Cambodian officials found responsible for suppressing political opposition in the authoritarian Southeast Asian country.

Titled the Cambodia Democracy Act of 2021, H.R.4686 would bar entry to the United States by senior Cambodian officials deemed responsible by the U.S. president for having “directly and substantially undermined democracy in Cambodia.”

The bill if signed into law by the U.S. president would also restrict financial transactions and freeze assets held in the United States by targeted Cambodian officials.

Speaking to RFA, Voeun Veasna—a forest activist who fled Cambodia and now lives in Thailand—said that the bill if made law will benefit victims of government persecution in Cambodia and force Hun Sen to engage in talks with the CNRP to improve human rights and democracy.

“As an activist, I urge Hun Sen to stop being stubborn and return to negotiations for the sake of peace in the nation,” he said.

Another CNRP activist, Leng Sotheary, said though that the proposed law will only embarrass Hun Sen on the international stage. “And when Hun Sen gets angry, he arrests even more activists and puts them in jail,” she said.

Chhim Phalvorun, spokesman for Cambodia’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) said however that the bill is being used by the United States as a device to undermine what he called Cambodia’s position of neutrality in the competition between the U.S. and China, Cambodia’s powerful northern neighbor and supporter.

“The U.S. legislation is just the title of a song,” he said. “In fact, it is only a political tool for the U.S. to use against China, using Cambodia as a pretext.”

Cambodia’s Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP in November 2017, two months after arresting its president Kem Sokha over an alleged plot to overthrow the government. Scores of supporters of the group have since been incarcerated, awaiting a tortuous legal process made slower by COVID-19 restrictions.

The move came amid a wider crackdown by Hun Sen on the country’s political opposition, independent media, and NGOs that allowed the CPP to win all 125 seats in parliament in a July 2018 election and drew U.S. sanctions and the suspension of trade privileges with the European Union.

Reported by RFA’s Khmer Service. Translated by Samean Yun. Written in English by Richard Finney.

British Royal Navy frigate HMS Richmond has arrived in Vietnam on a four-day friendly visit after transiting through the Taiwan Strait, angering China.

The frigate posted a picture docked in Cam Ranh Bay on Friday, followed by a video, on its Twitter page, saying in Vietnamese: “Hello Vietnam! So proud for Richmond to have an opportunity to visit your beautiful country.”

A statement from the British Embassy in Hanoi said, “the ship’s presence underlines the U.K.’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, at the heart of which lies the U.K.’s partnership with Viet Nam.”

It also said the HMS Richmond and Vietnamese partners will conduct “bilateral cooperation activities” without giving details.

Four days ago, China condemned the frigate’s passage through the Taiwan Strait saying the United Kingdom is “carrying out a meaningless display of presence with an insidious intention.”

In an unusual move, HMS Richmond broadcast its location while sailing through the sensitive strait, prompting China to dispatch military units to follow and monitor the passage. Publicizing the passage was widely seen as a deliberate act by the U.K. to confirm that the Taiwan Strait is international waters and part of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The Type 13-frigate, part of the HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier strike group, is visiting Vietnam after “a busy period working with partners and allies in the East China Sea,” it announced earlier.

The Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) led by the HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier made its first port call in Japan earlier this month following exercises with Japanese and U.S. partners in August.

The Royal Navy has also deployed two patrol vessels to the Indo-Pacific on a five-year mission to bolster Britain’s presence in the region.

In July, the UK Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace made his first-ever visit to Vietnam.

Hanoi has always been careful not to offend Beijing and the HMS Richmond’s visit is not being featured yet in main official news outlets such as the Nhan Dan (the Communist Party’s mouthpiece) and Quan Doi Nhan Dan (the Vietnamese army’s newspaper).

However China’s increasing assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea where the two neighbors have overlapping claims, has led Vietnam to expand its military and strategic cooperation with other nations.

The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has expelled former vice minister for public security Sun Lijun for “serious violations of discipline” on the eve of its Oct. 1 National Day celebrations, accusing him of building cliques and cabals to take over a key government department.

Sun, who has been held by the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) for several months, was found to have “overweening political ambitions” and “arbitrarily disagreed with central policy guidelines,” the CCDI said in a statement on its official website.

Sun had “created and spread political rumors, taken actions against others, wove a web of deceit to obtain political capital and … used unscrupulous means … to form gangs, cliques and interest groups within the party and build his personal power,” the Sept. 30 statement said.

“He formed a cabal to take control over [a] key department[s], seriously jeopardizing political security and party unity,” it said.

Under the CCP hierarchy, the most critical departments are the “leading groups” under the CCP Central Committee, which coordinate the work of the ministries under them.

Departments engaged in military work, the domestic and external security apparatus, economic management, and ideology and propaganda are also considered crucial.

Sun’s inclusion in the leading group managing the COVID-19 pandemic suggests that the public health emergency was also seen as a potential threat to domestic security, and the stability of the CCP regime.

According to the CCDI, Sun had also built a private stash of confidential materials, resigned without authorization on the frontline of the pandemic, and placed his “cronies” in positions of power.

The CCDI also accused Sun of “extreme greed” and of illegally accepting huge amounts of assets while in office.

“Sun Lijun seriously violated the party’s political discipline, organizational discipline and integrity as well as Chinese laws, and is a criminal suspect,” it said, saying the nature of Sun’s alleged offenses was “particularly serious.”

It said the CCDI and the Central Committee had decided that Sun should be expelled from the CCP and from any public posts held, and his case transferred to the state prosecutor, paving the way for a trial.

A selective campaign

Hu Ping, U.S.-based founder of the online magazine Beijing Spring, said Sun was definitely corrupt, but that didn’t explain why he was only being investigated now.

“He has been corrupt for a very long time, so why is he falling from grace now?” Hu said. “It shows that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is selective.”

“Anyone who is seen as politically reliable by Xi Jinping will be safe,” he said.

Hu said the accusation that Sun had stored confidential materials was particularly important, as there had been rumors that Sun had leaked secrets about the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic to Australia.

“This is why Australia is getting particularly tough on China on the issue of tracing the origins [of the pandemic],” Hu said. “Maybe those rumors weren’t groundless after all.”

Sun, 52, has a degree in public health from New South Wales State University in Australia.

He was promoted to deputy minister for public security in 2018, and has previously served as director of the Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan office within the same ministry.

His last public appearance was in March 2020 in Wuhan, where the pandemic emerged in late 2019, and where Sun was sent as part of a central government steering group to lead the pandemic response.

U.S.-based legal scholar Teng Biao said Sun’s downfall is likely connected with a power struggle in the corridors of Zhongnanhai.

“At the very least, we can see that the power struggle in party ranks has intensified,” Teng said. “The CCDI makes no secret of that in its report.”

The CCDI statement was published one day after a meeting in Beijing of the public security leading group’s education and rectification group.

Executive vice minister for public security Wang Xiaohong told the meeting that it was important to “totally eliminate the drug-like influence of [jailed security minister] Zhou Yongkang, [detained former Interpol president] Meng Hongwei, Sun Lijun and others” from the team to ensure “purity.”

‘The entire inside story’

A former local official in the domestic security apparatus who gave only the surname He said he was surprised by the admission that Sun had stashed secret documents.

“The most important thing in this announcement is that he kept a large number of top-secret documents in his possession,” He said. “Given his professional expertise [relating to the pandemic], why was Sun Lijun detained?”

“The main reason is that he knows the entire inside story of [China’s handling of] the pandemic,” He said.

“He felt at the time that the measures being introduced would be disastrous, and so he lodged a complaint with the highest authorities,” He said. “That’s tantamount to saying the emperor has no clothes on.”

“You come to a sticky end in this system if you annoy your superiors.”

A Chinese journalist with connections to the political elite, who gave only the surname Liu, said professionalism has never been of much account in deciding the fate of CCP leaders.

“It’s never about whether you are professional or unprofessional, but always about whether you are loyal or disloyal,” Liu said. “If you won’t be used by [the CCP], then you could bring disaster down on them.”

Repeated calls to the ministry of public security and the Hubei provincial coronavirus prevention and control headquarters rang unanswered on Oct. 1, which is a national holiday in China.

Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.

China may face a significant challenge to its energy security if it tries to retaliate against Australia for plans to acquire nuclear submarine technology from the United Kingdom and the United States.

On Sept. 16, Beijing blasted the announcement one day earlier that Australia will join in a new security partnership known as AUKUS that plans to develop a nuclear powered submarine fleet “to sustain peace and stability across the entire Indo-Pacific region.”

At a press conference, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, made it clear that China did not buy the assurance of senior U.S. officials in a background briefing for reporters that the security initiative “is not aimed or about any one country.”

The submarine deal “has seriously undermined regional peace and stability, intensified the arms race and undermined international non-proliferation efforts,” Zhao said, according to a ministry transcript.

“China always believes that any regional mechanism should … contribute to enhancing mutual trust and cooperation among regional countries. It should not target any third party or undermine its interests,” Zhao said.

Western media have interpreted the AUKUS pact as a response to China’s military buildup and territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Under the plan to provide Canberra with more capable and stealthier subs, “Australia may be conducting routine patrols that could sail through areas of the South China Sea that Beijing now claims as its own exclusive zone, and range as far north as Taiwan,” Britain’s The Guardian said.

Although the conventionally armed but nuclear powered vessels are not expected to be launched until late in the next decade, the plan could open a new chapter in China’s retaliatory campaign against Australian trade and economic interests in the near term.

Despite a free trade agreement since 2015, China has been punishing Australia for policies ranging from its support for Hong Kong democracy dissidents to its calls for investigating the origins of COVID-19.

Over the past two years, Chinese authorities have imposed cutbacks and crackdowns on Australian exports of products including wine, barley, lobster, copper and coal.

The retaliatory measures have mostly focused on products that Beijing can afford to forgo, although analysts are divided on whether the ban on Australian coal has contributed to shortages and record prices for China’s main fuel this year.

Until now, the authorities have been careful to avoid restricting imports of largely irreplaceable Australian iron ore for fear of damaging China’s steel industry.

But even that safe haven for Australia may be endangered as China cuts steel output to meet emissions targets and property development fades due to rising debt risk.

Trade friction

In mid-September, iron ore futures dropped by double digits following reports of expanded production controls, PMN Business news said.

As China runs out of Australian trade categories that it can safely punish, it may be tempted to retaliate against its supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG), the second leading commodity import from the country after iron ore.

For now, Australia remains China’s leading supplier of the super-chilled fuel, accounting for 45 percent of its LNG imports until the share recently slipped to 43 percent, according to UK-based energy consultants Wood Mackenzie.

“I don’t think China can afford to cut Australian LNG imports anytime soon,” said Mikkal Herberg, energy security research director for the Seattle-based National Bureau of Asian Research.

“This winter would be disastrous to do so. LNG is sold out globally, essentially,” Herberg said by email.

In May, Bloomberg News reported that two of China’s smaller traders were told to avoid buying new LNG cargoes from Australia, although no similar signal was sent to the country’s major importers, the national oil companies (NOCs).

In June, Wood Mackenzie said in a posting that the report of LNG restrictions was “unconfirmed,” but it may have been an indicator of pressure for broader curbs to come.

The potential for targeting Australia’s LNG trade has been closely watched this year because of a collision of factors.

After a slump that extended through February, Asian LNG prices on the spot market have soared to record highs as China displaces Japan to become the world’s biggest buyer.

The price spike has reportedly made some Chinese importers reluctant to buy more LNG, but pre-winter stock building has combined with pressure to cut carbon emissions from coal, driving spot prices even higher.

Record gas prices, low storage levels and shortages in Europe have caused further tightening.

Some buyers are hoping that prohibitive LNG prices will eventually force fuel switching and temper demand, S&P Global Platts said.

Energy and climate

But China’s demand for both pipeline gas and LNG has been high despite rising costs as the country faces pressure to constrain coal and meet climate goals.

In the first eight months of the year, combined gas imports jumped 22.2 percent from a year earlier, accounting for over 44 percent of China’s supplies of the fuel, according to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data.

Despite bilateral tensions, Australia’s LNG shipments to China climbed in August with nine additional cargoes compared with July, the Australian Financial Review reported, citing an analysis by consultancy EnergyQuest.

China’s LNG imports climbed 23.3 percent through August, based on customs figures, lngprime.com reported.

In the longer term, Australia’s submarine deal may pose a strategic predicament for China, with energy security at its core.

Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea have been driven in part by its needs for offshore resources and demands to control its vital trade routes for energy imports.

But with a fleet of silent nuclear submarines patrolling the contested waters, the claims of control and issues of free passage may remain unresolved.

In the near term, China’s attempts to punish Australia for the AUKUS initiative may only succeed in trading one vulnerability for another by highlighting its reliance on energy imports through the very same waters.

While deployment of Australian nuclear submarines may be far in the future, China’s energy import dependence is also likely to continue for years.

“Their targets for domestic gas production are already very ambitious and still imply growing dependence on imported gas,” Herberg said.

“It’s hard to see when the LNG market will be supplied enough to make a shift feasible,” said Herberg. “Only in the case that the global LNG market went into huge surplus could they entertain the notion of eliminating Australian LNG.”

“I would put LNG in the same basket as Australian iron ore. It’s very difficult for China to diversify away from Australian iron ore, so they just ignore the contradiction,” he said.